Rationality in Fundamentalist and Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy

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Abstract: In this article, after reviewing the difference between fundamentalist and anti-fundamentalist philosophy, the features of the rationality will be explained from the perspective of five anti-fundamentalist philosophers (Habermas, Richard Rorty, MacIntyre, Michel Foucault and Hayek). The common point stated by all these philosophers is that they all criticize metaphysics and doubt about the basis of fundamentalist narrative on the world that rely on two predicates: first, the world has rational constitution and it is possible to reduce it to precise mathematical relations and second, that basis of the world is reflected totally in the mind of human beings.

Keywords: Fundamentalist Rationality, Anti-fundamentalist Rationality, Otherness, Neoliberalism, Practical Expediency, Communicative Rationality

Introduction

Principally, political philosophy is the consequence of developments and incidents in which status-quo structure and political order of this structure are challenged when solving important issues of the society. In other words, political philosophy shapes at a period that reproduction of political order by relying on traditional resources and on mere motivational aspects become impossible. Emergence of a new philosophical order means emergence of new bases for answering the principle questions of political realms such as: "what is the purpose of political order?", "What should the political order rely on?", "What is the source of political sovereignty?", and the like. Therefore, when the philosophical questions become fundamental, questioning of foundations emerges again, and a new period in political philosophy emerges.

In this article it is claimed that political philosophy has changed since the Second World War, i.e. previous thought order has broken down and has been replaced by the new order. We will argue the previous order under the heading of fundamentalist narrative and the new order under the title of anti-fundamentalist narrative.

The Issue of Political Requirements of Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy

After the First World War, especially after the Capitalism Crisis in 1929, Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism which totally captured all aspects of human life, from a totalitarian point of view, suddenly emerged. Fascism and Nazism focused on race and Stalinism asserted on Proletariat as considering the focal points of the world and the foundations of affairs. From the perspective of many twentieth century thinkers, the roots of these ideologies were some kinds of modern fundamentalism that relied on an understanding of Platonic Tradition. Two trends can be manifested in the fundamentalist narrative: 1) Emergence of logical Positivism that taught a profound faith in scientific understanding and stated that the assumption which cannot be experimented, were meaningless, altogether. Therefore, concepts such as freedom, equality, justice and rights were put aside as they were considered meaningless. This caused the loss of interest in moral issues by philosophers. 2) Emergence of behavioral revolution under which scientists believing it, took away from normative political
thought. This meant that the concepts such as democracy could be defined in terms of measurable political behaviors. These two significant upheavals marginalized political philosophy and weakened the possibility of critical judgment and rationality by kinds of scientific thinking in the domain of politics.

After the 1960s, however, the political philosophy was revived with a new essential force, and the previous intensive separation of politics and political philosophy vanished gradually. This was accomplished because of the following reasons:

First, increasing discontent from behaviorism which prevented political analysis toward the arena beyond the observable events, limited the arena of political analysis. Moreover, the faith in the power of science to discover the objective truth was diminishing, especially after the publication of Thomas Kuhn's article (1961) which asserts that scientific knowledge is not absolute and is conditional to the beliefs and theories that require researching.

Second, emergence of the new social movements in the 1960s and deterioration of social politics, which turned back the normative and ideological issues to political analyses. These ideas are reflected in the works of political theorists of the new generation such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick (Heywood, 1999, p.30).

Third, the emergence of the widespread political conservatism in the 1980s, calling for moral revival, turning back to society and religion which was an extremist form of religious fundamentalism (the most famous of which were Islamic and Christian), and other forms of neo-liberalism all led to the criticism and accusation of modern liberal individualism and to the annihilation of social foundation. Liberalism realized the necessity of re-determination of its principles, and reproduction of its legitimacy against new thought movements. This issue needed the renovation of a normative narrative.

However, the need for normative dialogue did not mean total surrendering to previous narratives at all. By then, mentioned developments were the starting points of this criticism of classic political philosophy and founding of a new paradigm for normative dialogues. Actually, political philosophers of late twentieth century all agreed that events such as Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism had their roots in classic understanding of political issues and the radical criticism of mentioned incidents called for the radical criticism of the mentioned foundations.

In sum, in criticizing the classic philosophy it could be stated that Enlightenment Period and—the scientific rationality of the twentieth century which was its logical outcome—was not merely a philosophical movement, development ideology. In fact, it was the faith to gradual development, absolute truths and rational planning of ideal social systems that were illustrated in the form of Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism. Therefore, freedom cannot be found in such a restricted paradigm, freedom cannot be found where the only real device of self-expression is obedience to the paradigm. Because there is no possibility of an action whether small or limited, an action that is decided by our own will and not by the intervention of others. Essence of freedom is the ability to perform an action that you intend, because you want to act this way, a selection without coercion and force, without absorption in a kind of widespread system, to have the right of resisting, the right of resisting against assimilations, the right of defending your beliefs, because they are your beliefs. This freedom is real, except that there isn’t any other form of freedom and even picture of freedom (Berlin, 2002: 8, 9 and 167). Berlin states: Freedom is freedom; it is not the equality, fairness, justice, culture, human happiness or conscience tranquility (Ibid, p.15).

After a synoptic explanation of the specifications of fundamentalist and anti-fundamentalist philosophy, this paper is trying to consider the features of the post metaphysics and metaphysics philosophy from the perspective of five eminent postmodernist philosophers (Habermas, Foucault, Rorty, MacIntyre, Hayek), to show how any of mentioned five philosophers tries to describe anti-fundamentalist philosophy and reject fundamentalist one in different ways. Habermas and Rorty and Hayek from the creative standpoint, Foucault from the methodological view and MacIntyre from the historical perspective challenge fundamentalist philosophy and develop the anti-fundamentalist philosophy.

Features of Fundamentalist and Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy

The political philosophy at the onset observed two different movements: the Platonic Tradition and the Aristotelian Tradition. Actually, these two
traditions have always remained eminent traditions of political philosophy. Half of Europe's Christian centuries can be associated with Platonic tradition and half of Aristotelian tradition. Modern political thought approaches to Platonic political philosophy and the political thought in the twentieth century return to that of Aristotle again. Turning from one philosopher to the other is adherence to turning of political philosophy from assumption of politics realm independence, or necessity of the reliance of political philosophy relies on primary issues (Mohammadi and Abdolkarimi, 2005:12).

Principally, the whole of philosophy was created while Malatians reduced all of world with all its multiplicity and diversity to ok essence such as water, soil and the like. From this perspective, i.e. ideas in Platonic narrative, God from the standpoint of metaphysical understanding of religion is placed in this framework.

Fundamentalistic understanding basically considers the world as one subject and one object, i.e. the world has a presence and a base; seemingly, human being's essence has one physical dimension and one subjective and rational foundation that are invisible. Fundamentalistic understanding requires linking our internal to the internal of the world or our external to the external of the world. Reaching to world's internal is conditioned to going out of individual's wishes which are dependent on body and to strengthening his/her internal that emerges in individual's subjective enormity and rational strength. Since Fundamentalistic understanding believes that the world's essence is reflected in human being's mind, is subject-oriented. In other words, fundamentalist philosophy by relying on the link between these two internals grants existentialist originality to the concept of awareness. In other words, awareness is always regarded as more real side of issues. The overall philosophical question in this fundamentalist understanding is that to what extent is this world demonstrated appropriately in the mirror of human being's mind? Since in people's minds just the shadow of nobilities (world's essence) emerges, it is necessary for the philosopher to infiltrate in the internal of the world and discover the truth. And eventually the discovered truth by the philosopher becomes a principle which attracts attentions in all realms such as politics and ethics. In premodern fundamentalist narrative, God was the essence of the world and the philosopher was supposed to reach the truth by connecting to the essence of the world (God) and to determine the duties of people. However, in modern fundamentalist narrative the real essence of the world attributes not to God, but to a mechanical mathematical order; in other words, the world is reduced to a precise mechanical and mathematical relations. (Mohammadi and Abdolkarimi, 2005, p.13) Therefore, in modern fundamentalism we decompose the complex forms of the world to fundamental components and then in the light of a precise mathematical relation between these irresolvable points, we find the complex forms of the world. Freud, for example, assumes sexual instinct as the most fundamental structure of human being's essence. Then all things are reducible to sexual instinct as a foundation.

Therefore fundamentalist philosophy has two eminent bases:

1) World follows a rational, regulated and self-relying system.
2) The rational order is totally reflected in human being's awareness.

If we doubt on two mentioned interpretations, since early twentieth century kinds of philosophical tendencies gradually appeared that led philosophy to an anti-fundamentalist understanding of the world. According to this philosophy, foundation turn to myths and the philosopher does not claim acquisition of foundation. Anti-fundamentalist philosophy by doubting the claim that we can be creatures independent of the world, relies on this principle that truth of things is neither external nor internal of us, but is between things and us, i.e. we are not independent of the world, rather always dealing with the world. The world is not free from the way we see it; our view of the world confirms the way world is reflected to us. General belief of anti-fundamentalist philosophers is this statement that we don't confront with world, but confront with a permanent world that is created by our language. Therefore the world does not have one foundation and if it does, it is not acquired by human beings, because we are living in a world that is created by our language and it is fictitious (Mohammadi and Abdolkarimi, 2005, p.14).

Generally it could be stated that a principle in fundamentalist philosophy is that the acquainted agent legitimates all things and especially knowledge and science of human being. However in the understanding of anti-fundamentalist philosophy, there is no authority, distributor or appraiser of titles such as "nature", "human" or "future" that provides entireness and unity for the world and possibility of objective or impartial knowledge of
the world. In this philosophy human being's awareness is a secondary process and has its roots in concepts such as will and unconsciousness. Everyone with regard to his especial history and geography in one way or another legitimates the world, knowledge and himself. In the anti-fundamentalist philosophy we attend to historicity in every thought system. Every thought system i.e. every episteme and discourse is the product of its time, has its own history and is created for the system that answers to human being's questions, the human being who is surrounded in his historical time and can't escape from this history and time. Thus it is impossible to create a thought system, logically and knowledgeably, that is applicable universally to all times and centuries (Mohammadi and Abdolkarimi, 2005, pp.12-15).

"About the classification of anti-fundamentalist philosophy, in spite of the lack of any classification system that thoroughly includes diversity of anti-fundamentalist philosophy, a classification including three parts can be introduced to facilitate understanding of the issues. These issues aren't opposite to each other, but generally overlap". (Kahoone, 1996, p17)

1) Historical Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy
According to this philosophy it can be argued that social, political or cultural organization of the fundamentalist philosophy has changed fundamentally, as we face now a new world. Fundamentalist philosophy has come to its end or is exposed to fundamental change. This claim does not call for any suggestion of normative claim, i.e. it isn't necessary for us to state that the fundamentalist philosophy has been mistaken.

2) Methodological Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy
This philosophy rejects the possibility of establishment of knowledge foundations, and the ability of total confidence to it, as reputable and realistic ones, i.e. claim of knowledge for illustration of truth and reality and independent nature of its belongings, and demonstrates that traditional philosophical distinctions made between real and ideal, objective and subjective, truth and appearance, data and theory are doubtful. The methodological anti-fundamentalist philosophy commits this activity on the basis of criticism of traditional theories of knowledge and meaning or on the basis of criticism of exposed humanistic interests in the false creation of these distinctions. Methodological anti-fundamentalist philosophy is anti-realistic-i.e.it claims that knowledge is authenticated not by its relation with nobilities, but by its relation with our strategic interests or our common perspectives, needs, modes of our statements and the like-and/or it is anti-fundamentalist- i.e. annihilator of a philosophical attempt for justification of realism.

3) Affirmative Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy
Further affirmative interpretation of every phenomenon is based on the methodological criticism of previous phenomenon. This philosophy may be revise self, God, nature, knowledge, society, art or every other thing on the basis of the criticism of unity, source or presence and the like. This subject refers to the approach that associates general concepts of anti-fundamentalist philosophy to especial topics so that it provides new insights or understandings of it. This kind of philosophy presents a choice or solution (Kahoone, 1996, p.17-18).

Historical Perspective
Features of Fundamentalist and Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy From the Perspective of MacIntyre
MacIntyre who is among the traditional communitarians, "explicitly makes reference to the subject of Aristotelian objective as his point of start so that to keep aloof from atomistic in liberal tradition and avoid attraction toward generality and substitute concepts such as nation and class" (Tomilson, 2000, p xiii). Therefore "contrary to ethical theories of Kant and utilitarianism that hopelessly follow general rules for actions that get exalted from culture, he ignores the character, pays attention to ethics superiority on the basis of Aristotle virtue and expression of order for the features of ideal ethical characters" (Kahoone, 1996, p.548).

MacIntyre believes that we always follow a narrative structure, regulate our own world that is exposed to experiment. Our world of life is narrative, i.e. every event is understandable in a network of incidents. The fundamental structure of social life is narrative, and rationality shapes inside that narrative structure. Rationality is the production of a structure that is preceded by narration of daily action of our life.
According to MacIntyre, modern rationality that is based upon fundamentalist philosophy, has taken away the possibility of unity among human beings by creating two obstacles:

1) Modern rationality specialize human being's life and decomposes it to numerous parts and because of this, it is impossible to make harmony between these incompatible parts of life according to any rationality and conceptual structure. Consequently, modern life has taken us away from the possibility of a portrait of a unified self.

2) The philosophical obstacle that exists in analytical philosophy.

The position of modern thought is essentially based on the assumption of decomposing whole to thought portions and organizing these portions again around an essential portion. Marx, for example, decomposes the totality of social life to an essential part such as job, and then all other portions such as politics, religion and ethics are based on this fundamental action (Kahoone, 1996, p. 548).

For MacIntyre, human being is not rational but is being with action orientation; this means that the rationality is not a solid and subjective portrait or a system but appears during rationality human action or in other words, human beings acquire implicit awareness during action. MacIntyre for modern essentialism or fundamentalism that seek an essential act or part, replaces communicators issues, i.e. the world is a collection of relations or in other words, the world is the collection of coincidence of vectors, and the sense of stability is created in the situation of coincidence of several vectors, but this stability is relative and synoptic. MacIntyre believes that the modern world divides the world to different portions by interpretation of world, the way it decomposes speech to different predicates and portions that are of no especial meaning. From the perspective of MacIntyre it is because of different relations that these discourses get meaningful. Therefore, the rationality is based on communication, not foundation. Thus, the foundation of anti-fundamentalist philosophy is of kind of real and practical life not of theoretical one.

MacIntyre is basically a criticizer of individualism in whom modernists and postmodernists believe. In his view, there are communicator existences among us i.e. when we get meaningful when we are in relations and in coincidence of vectors and connections or in another words, the individual and concept of whole are united with each other. Actions intrinsically do not have real meanings unless they are in the narrative that gives meaning to this action, the narrative that has no beginning and ending and is diverse and augmentative. From the viewpoint of MacIntyre, ethics in the fundamentalist philosophy is based on independent selves and we measure life with these selves. For example, beauty, goodness and knowledge are three independent essential parts of ethics and because of separation among these three essential parts, virtue becomes meaningless. But in the anti-fundamentalist philosophy, the concept of virtue is naturally produced from inside of narrative structure of life. Here, rationality is mixed with life and ethics. Therefore, beauty, goodness and knowledge get meaning in the internal of the concept of narrative.

Methodological Perspective

Features of Anti-Fundamentalist and Fundamentalist Philosophy from the Viewpoint of Foucault

From the viewpoint of Foucault, the rationality is basically an objective concept nor knowledge, or a subjective system. Rationality is an area of politics whose responsibility is to regulate the political affairs. Rationality is shaped somehow in relations.

According to Foucault, in the fundamentalist philosophy it was supposed that the meaning exists in the depth, i.e. we had to view it from the inside and its depth, to understand the meaning of an object, but in the anti-fundamentalist philosophy the meaning isn't in depth, rather it is outside, therefore, it discloses meaning.

By Foucault, the anti-fundamentalist rationality becomes anti-fundamentalist in the sense that knowledge loses its centrality and thence the awareness becomes incredible. Awareness is a part of objective relations that shapes rationality. Therefore, as Foucault believes, both individualism and totalitarianism have their roots in political rationality through which the states, both in fundamentalist and neokanti- fundamentalist philosophy period exert their domination. In other words, according to Foucault there are two sorts of discourse for exercising domination: 1- Greek discourse, 2- Oriental discourse. Foucault believes that the modern dominance is a mixed pattern of these two dis-
courses one of which appears in the form of Government and the other in the shape of police. In the model of Greek governance, the city, law, land and the like were superior, the governor did not interfere with private affairs, rather was supervising the public affairs. By contrast, in the Oriental pattern, there were cattlemen and shepherdess in which shepherds interfered all affairs of human life. In the modern world, these two sorts of exercising the dominance are mixed, i.e. the concept of city, law and ethics has acquired objectivity, but there is still shepherdess in exerting power. Modern dominance has penetrated into the most internal layers of human life.

Foucault, therefore, exposes the modern dominance system which is generally more predominantly and shrewd than its previous forms, the power of this system is concealed under this issue that it is manifested not as dominance, but as the science perfection, or even freedom. Generally, it can be said that rationality by Foucault "is subject to the rationality regime that is reflected in power relations, and a society free from power relations is considered merely an abstraction, because such dominance systems spread alongside human society. In other words, we can neither find a society free of restraints of dominance nor the determination of historical millennium to which we can attract the dominated and exploited subjects to, because power relations or practical methods are inherent in the society in the contrast of other issue of active subjects" (Foucault, 2001, pp. 126-7).

"The truth for Foucault is not a truth philosophers such as Kant and Hegel were looking for. He does not look for the context that expresses the best debates with the most solid logic. He does not investigate discourses such as truth for the reason of presenting analysis of their concepts. Discourses such as truth and freedom from the viewpoint of Foucault are power cores; they should not be viewed from the perspective of their writers or readers, rather it is necessary to attend to these discourses from this view that how they create dominance relations" (Azodanlou, 2006, p.55)

Affirmative Perspective

Features of the Fundamentalist and Anti-Fundamentalist Philosophy from the Perspective of Rorty

From the viewpoint of Rorty, anti-fundamentalist philosophy is shaped on the basis of practical rationality and relies on practical interest. Anti-fundamentalist philosophy looks for an idea of truth based on ethnic solidarity and gets completed in relation with others. According to Rorty, everything in anti-fundamentalist philosophy is metaphoric and the foundation of everything turns the myth, the truth neither inside nor outside us, rather it is between things and us, i.e. we are distinct from the world and the truth is created by the way we view things. Therefore, the knowledge does not have the origin of reference. The truth isn't coincident with essence, what creates the solidarity is the truth. "Hence Rorty by converting the philosophy to an irony to provide solidarity, suspended any sort of claim for truth and made his utopist pattern of political issues not based on philosophical truths and human rationality, but on human imagination" (Rorty, 1989, pp.73-76) and "criticized any attempt for reviving the fundamental role of philosophical rationality" (Ibid, p. 26-30).

Fundamentalist philosophy, by Rorty, is accomplished in relation with things and nature, he believes that the idea of truth is an ultra-cultural and ultra-historical idea, fundamentalist philosophy is much theoretical and tries to make the reality as close as possible to theoretical patterns (theoretical rationality). In addition, this philosophy is behind the accomplisher of a plan, on the basis of what is supposed to be ultra-cultural truth. This means that the political issue is not self-actualized; rather the principle is on rational criteria relying on the essence of human being, and on ultra-cultural and ultra-historical formations. In fundamentalist philosophy, the idea of nature and essence is intensively ultra-cultural on the one hand and intensive-ly biological (according to the essence of human being) on the other hand. In this philosophy, rationality is based on external and theoretical expediency and a sort of duality between truth and reality is created (Kahoone, 1996, pp. 590-604).

Features of Anti-Fundamentalist and Fundamentalist Philosophy from the Perspective of Hayek

Hayek, following Oakeshott's tradition, believes that the politics isn't of theoretical kind, rather is of practical one, or in other words, it isn't subject to a theoretical structure, rather it is presented implicitly in practical context of our life. Hayek believes that the modern state believing in welfare has con-
verted everything in daily life which is of knowledge-skill kind to precise logical-theoretical knowledge. In the view of Hayek, basically organizational requirement of people’s livelihood is subject to a complex, numerous, innumerable, divergent and changeable system that basically is not able to convert to precise knowledge forms. The knowledge-skills that are produced and transformed in the practical context of our life, is objective, and if we try to transform it to precise subjective mode, they will lose their power of practicality. For example, the welfare oriented state makes the real forms of the market which is based on practical experience of people life subject to the precise knowledge, and by this process blunts the function of market, i.e., with the interference of state the current dynamic function of market is disabled practically and the state faces crisis.

According to Hayek, the intention of making great changes in the context of society is, in a way fundamentalism, because this intention always tries to reduce the essence of reality to a foundation which can be placed in state or in any other fundamental part. Marx, for example, reduces the existing reality to a fundamental portion such as exploitation; as a result exploitation changes to a factor which considers the existing real context both non-ethical and full of crisis. Then revolution in terms of an essential rational virtue attacks the context of reality so that to transform it to an essential rational form.

Generally following Hayek, in the fundamentalist philosophy freedom is of theoretical and rational type, for whose establishment on the basis of creating a utopia many attempts has been made, but it never become real, and often presupposes that there is an unrestrained power of human rationality and consequently makes him happy and acquiescent. In the fundamentalist philosophy the freedom can’t be achieved except by requiring an absolute and collective objective. Thus, freedom and the apex of political civilization are in being organized i.e.in the highest interference of the state. In anti-fundamentalist philosophy, freedom is of empirical type and free of limitations of concrete theoretic systems which is based on interpretations of self-stimulated traditions and institutions but were not understood completely. In addition, in anti-fundamentalist philosophy the essence of freedom, self-stimulation and non-coercion, and the value of freedom depend on the possibilities that are provided for non-designed issues. For the anti-fundamentalist philosophy, the tradition derived from custom is the criteria of practice, and it resorts to institutions and traditions for removing of incompatibility of interests, the traditions and institutions that are the products of human practice and survival of prospective individuals.

**Features of Anti-Fundamentalist and Fundamentalist Philosophy from the Perspective of Habermas**

Habermasian rationality relies on the category of debate of intersubjective communication which believes that we achieve consensus via debate and intersubjective communication. This is a brief consensus of truth. Hence the truth exists but is brief. Therefore, Habermasian intersubjective rationality adheres to the idea of truth, but its position is not solid and severe, because it is possible that every time a new subject of debate is started and the idea of a new truth is shaped. Hence the idea of truth follows a historical process, is created in the context of debate and is annihilated in the context of debate.

From the viewpoint of Habermas, in the anti-fundamentalist philosophy, rationality is based upon the pattern of mutual understanding; i.e., rationality is assessed in terms of abilities of responsible participants that attend to claims of communication inclined to intersubjective understanding; that is to say that debate should have truth, be permissible, acceptable and truthful. Debate should have truth; i.e., be connected to a reality and should be permissible and be acceptable in terms of common cultural values of a society. In other words, in anti-fundamentalist philosophy the rationality is restrained by the circumstances, i.e., by connection of wisdom with time historicity, reality of external nature, baseless and coreless subjectivity of internal essence, and with material features of society that is defined not by maintaining or removing of some elements, but by the practical process of progress, and development of fundamental powers which take place under the circumstances of “non-selection”. Wisdom does not exist apart from “otherness” of itself, and from the functionalist perspective becomes necessary because of this “otherness”; in other words, the representation of rational practice it is the wisdom that is annexed to history, society, human body and language.

In the view of Habermas, in anti-fundamentalist philosophy communicative rationality is emerged in an understanding of the world which is coreless and baseless and it considers this reality that sym-
bolic (subjective) reproduction of life-world and its corporeal (objective) reproduction relate to each other internally. "According to this philosophy, the active wisdom in communicative interaction is placed not only under external and objective limitations, but also the possibility of the existence of wisdom itself requires its decomposition to the dimensions of historical time, social space and corporeal experiments; rational power of speech is mixed with resources and possibilities of every world-life with especial possibilities. So long as the world-life functions as the provider of resources and supplements, and has intuitive, certain and universal cognitive features; a cognition that doesn’t become "problematic" because of our desires, and for this reason it isn’t explainer of cognition in any precise concept or sense. World-life becomes a resource of possibilities in which participators in social interaction, support their decrees and expressions, is inclined to consensus by resorting to it, and forms an equation for reaching a "synthesis" in which the philosophy of conscious subject (modern fundamentalist) had been attributed to awareness in general. Of course approaching to this meaning connects not to form and image but to contents of probable mutual understanding. The wisdom in communicative interaction by the shape of cultural self-understandings, by unconscious and intuitive links and correlations, and the abilities of sociable individuals which are manifested in skills, connects with traditions, social practices and a collection of corporeal experiences which form specific totality. Such essential special forms which are merely reflected in the form of multiplicity undoubtedly are not linked merely because of the reason of similar titles, but because of common structures with world-life totally. However such total structures are imprinted on especial forms of life merely because of the actions inclined to mutual understandings that are reproduced in that way,. This issue clears that how the importance of such total structures can be increased during historical processes of labor division and division in functions of structures. This is the key to the understanding of rationality process of world-life and its being free from rational ability inserted in communicative action continuously" (Kahoone, 1996, pp. 633-635).

"In general, Habermas' defense from intersubjective paradigm of communicative action in which epistemology politics is regulated ideally on the basis of the rational and free agreement, is a defense that accepts encompassing of cognition in practical considerations of social action while doesn’t forget to believe in general and exalted criteria; the criteria that bring about rational and free agreements in different and distinct realms of explaining (theoretic and practical discourse, aesthetic criticism, remedy-oriented criticism, enlightened discourse)" (Yetmahn, 1999, p.20).

From the view point of Habermas, in fundamentalist philosophy human creativity as a primary element which is preceded by any sort of human creativity is transformed to a self-created and self-nurtured element and shapes the duality between critical self-thought and not understandable thought which are not accessible by thinking. According to Habermas, in fundamentalist philosophy, the fact that the subject recognizes itself as the known subject is really dependent on a previous, indefinite and metasubjective object; something which is the position of human being in the world, the structure that is shaped accidentally or a dominance that determines special discourse. In fundamentalist philosophy, rationality initially refers to the desire of dynamic subjects and actors to acquire and apply undoubted cognition.

**Differences in the Concept of Anti-Fundamentalist Rationality from the Viewpoint of Habermas and Rorty**

Habermas tries to establish a foundation for criticism of status-quo or ethics in society. Hence, Habermas criticizes the Rorty on the basis of this principle that every form of political solidarity should be accepted. Because as Habermas states, in this case a criterion from outside is required according to which we can accept the solidarity. Therefore, as he contends, Rorty is affected again by fundamentalism because he brings about a criterion as a foundation for accepting the solidarity in society. By contrast, Rorty criticizes Habermas by stating that Habermas victimizes social hope in the society. In the view of Rorty, social hope isn’t necessarily considered on the basis of rational truth and rational falsehood, rather it is the capital of democracy and social system. Social hope is the social volition for forming of a better social life, and a hope for a better pattern of life.

Habermas, however, criticizes Rorty again that it is possible that even Fascism to create social hope, so we should recognize whether this social hope is acceptable rationally or non-acceptable. If
it is rational according to these principles then it should be accepted. Generally, it can be said that Habermasian rationality is based on communicative and intersubjective rationality and the Rortian rationality is based on the expediency of practice and according to this principle, Rorty states that debate, truth, falsehood, language and the like are obstacles to access social hope. Hope is created in a society when different groups in society are hopeful for their practical action.

Differences in the Concept of Anti-Fundamentalist Rationality from the Viewpoint of Foucault and Habermas

"Michel Foucault is appreciated for this reason that he has entered the concept of power to the perspective of contemporary philosophy. For this reason, Habermas is the criticizer of Foucault, not because power is incompatible with this perspective, but for this reason that Foucault's interpretation of power will cause lateral harms from which Foucault should be responsive from the philosophical point of view. Foucault introduces the concept of power while he attends to generational analysis of different modes of knowledge and non-discursive functions. He claims that power in reality is both the creator of knowledge and its function. Habermas, while accepting the concept of power, but asserts that it should be adjusted to a critical device that has the ability to establish normative distinctions between legitimate and non-legitimate uses of the power. For establishing such a distinction, he proposes a theory of communicative action in which ideal suppositions of discourse are re-recognized and re-justified according to what he calls "ethics of discourse". To the extent that Habermas seeks stabilization of these suppositions as inevitable universal concepts, Foucault does not try to hesitate on their existence; Foucault whose discussion is toward local rather than universal criticism, intensively uses generation recognition and criticism away from universal general norms and from the inside of discourse that is separated from the boundaries of science, selfness and power" (Kelly, 1991, pp.7-8).

Foucault believes that both Habermas and Rorty have ignored the oppressive aspect of power. From the viewpoint of Foucault, the debates basically have strategic features i.e. there is a stimulus of dominance in debates, so there can't be mutual understanding. According to Foucault, the rationality is the power itself. Discovering the rationality is the basic principle in Foucault's theory, i.e. Foucault tries to annihilate rationality so that he can discover society's oppressive character. In addition, Foucault criticizes Habermas for this reason that Habermas considers something like consensus as the production of rational subjects who are free of will of dominance (abstract subjects).

Differences between Habermas and MacIntyre on Anti-Fundamentalist Rationality

In the view of MacIntyre, human is a communal being. The correct Democracy is the communal one. Susceptible individuals are responsible. From the standpoint of Macintyre, narratives produce their judging values in this way that if a communal action is distinguished as rational, then it is accepted as a narrative and have the value of judging in society; therefore, it is not necessary for a complete and total framework of judging and it's transforming to a foundation to shape. From the view of MacIntyre, the most comprehensive communal value is the political one. Habermas criticizes MacIntyre for this reason that MacIntyre takes away possibility of general viewing in society; hence we can't state an opinion about society and criticize it.

Differences of MacIntyre and Rorty' Viewpoints in Anti-Fundamentalist Rationality

Rorty is Liberal and bases his foundation on the independent and free individual who puts his interests in priority, but his freedom is to the extent that the concepts of nation-state is not contradicted, i.e. first, he should have loyalty to the state then to his individual or ethnic interests, but MacIntyre states that the values shouldn’t be reversed and for this purpose if it is required, democracy' principles must be redefined so that not to be the denier of communal values. Rorty criticizes MacIntyre for the reason that MacIntyre abolishes the possibility of social solidarity.

Finally, Hayek defends the social equilibrium, and considering an actual individual inside a social self-stimulated tradition so that his social freedom is being supported via social custom.

Conclusion

Totally it can be stated that anti-fundamentalist philosophy is an especial way of viewing the world
and investigating it. Of course it doesn’t mean complete rupture from fundamentalism, "as Ihab Hassan (1985) argues: history is a multilayered narrative and our period possesses traditional, modern and postmodern features, simultaneously." (Gybenz and Baurimier, 1999:183 and 187). Political science can learn from Machiavelli who says that although we can never know the future definitely or predict it, we should never stop our attempt to knowing the future in terms of past and present. Future inevitably is in the core of human being and is the foundation of practical politics and is the favorite purpose of political scientists. Hence, in the approach of anti-fundamentalist philosophy toward future it can be said that this philosophy is interested in futures and not merely in one future; there never is one future, rather in a moment there exist different futures in the mind of individuals and groups. Also, the viewpoint of anti-fundamentalist philosophy does not need a linear or one-lined view. Moving from fundamentalism to anti-fundamentalism isn’t for the change in one-gradual and specific transformation and also isn’t a new metanarrative, rather it is a mixture of old and new elements in distinctive local and universal forms. Therefore, the formation of anti-fundamentalist narratives from the political issues can’t be the justifier of re-emergence of fundamentalistic political tendencies in the international politics’ arena at late twentieth century and early twenty first century. In the present situation we observe that in the United States, in Europe and in other Middle East countries, returning to narratives are relied on religion foundations have emerged in the political sphere that requires reproduction of Platonic interpretation (fundamentalism).

Therefore, the affirmative anti-fundamentalist philosophy which is based upon affirmative reinterpretation of every phenomenon on the basis of methodological criticism of previous phenomenon and returns to a writing which ok general contents of anti-fundamentalist philosophy to especial subjects so that it provides new insight or understanding of them, can better be responsive to anti-fundamentalist philosophy because it is the basis of this philosophy that according to Ihab Hassan, the period of anti-fundamentalist philosophy has traditional, modern and postmodern features, hence we should revise their existing contents such as self-ness, God, nature, knowledge, society, art and so on, to present a suitable solution.

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