

An Analytical View of Concept and Dimensions of War in
Carl Von Clausewitz’s Thought

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Abstract: War and war-related concepts constitute a considerable portion of key words in political literature and strategic-security studies. Apart from its theoretical significance, war is a palpable term for the individuals and political players. It is a serious threat to humanity that has been paid due attention in the course of history by the political philosophers, strategists and even ordinary people as a highly challenging social phenomenon. Therefore, war has always imposed and will always impose its impact on the ordinary life of people. Many thinkers have written on war thus far, but few of them like Tzu, Jomini, Hart and Carl von Clausewitz have managed to introduce a novel discussion on war and create outstanding work on military issues. Clausewitz, among them, introduced warfare in a quite new form in his magnum opus “On War” to create an unrivaled work on one hand, and exert influence on strategic thought on warfare on the other hand. In his book, he bestowed a futuristic and comprehensive insight on warfare issues upon political scientists. Clausewitz’s influence and perspicacity on war have introduced his thought as the completing piece of the puzzle on nature of war and as a great help to the military and political analysts. As a key member of continental school of military thought, Clausewitz could introduce to and redefine new terms such as friction, strategy, center of gravity, opportunity and chance in the military literature and promote popular war in a sense. His reinforced attitude toward war is an inseparable trinity of enmity, chance and subordination. This paper intends to study the concept and dimensions of war in Clausewitz’s doctrines.

Keywords: Clausewitz, War, Clausewitzian Nature of War, Trinity, Copernicus Revolution.

Introduction

“Politics since ancient times has been after promotion of human societies and polishing human deed and creed through expressing beliefs and viewpoints of renowned thinkers and philosophers, like Prometheus. It has two eagles on the sides: Machiavelli and Clausewitz. The first legitimized intrigue in war and the latter became an advocate of total war. These two, coupled with their opportunistic ancestors who sat on the throne of power, played big role in laying the foundation for past tyrant regimes and the present totalitarian systems. Their last remaining inheritors,
however, are now sitting idle in their ruins.” (Howard, 1992)

According to Gallie, Clausewitz is the first and even the last philosopher of war in the world. (Gallie, 1993) In this sense, his thoughts are very much worthy of contemplation. It is, however, difficult to understand his thought in comparison with his fellow countryman Hegel. This has given diversified interpretations of his theories so that some modern theorists and interpreters have claimed they want to “save Clausewitz from the Clausewitzians.” Clausewitz has been among thinkers and strategists with abundant critiques on his works. (Karami, 1998) In this sense, he is among the rare military theorists and strategists who has been both applauded and cursed. His proponents have applauded him as “war philosopher” who has studied all aspects of war and his critics have blamed him to be “an advocate of absolute wars of annihilation” and the “apostle of total war”. Analysts presenting impartial interpretation of his theories have found his works full of contradictory thoughts, i.e. somewhere he supports reasonable and philosophical use of force and somewhere else he advocates fighting until total annihilation of the enemy’s military power (Hosseini, 1994). At any rate, among all valuable works in Western literature only two works have specifically discussed warfare and war issues: the first book, the “History of Peloponnesian War”, has been written about 400 years BC by the Greek historian Thucydides and the second work is Clausewitz’s magnum opus “On War”, recognized by all experts as the most comprehensive theoretical work on warfare and military issues.

According to Boston Consulting Group’s Institute of Strategy, Clausewitz’s masterpiece is still the most general, applicable and enduring modern work of strategy and a source of insight into the nature of conflict still exerting great influence on analyses, theories and all the issues related to war and strategy. The institute in

“Clausewitz on Strategy” has analyzed Clausewitz’s theories on strategy. The introduction of this book reads:

“He was much more than a military academic. He was a practical soldier of wide experience, a historian and a historical philosopher, and a political theorist. Personally sensitive, shy and bookish, he could also be passionate in his politics and in his longing for military glory.” (Hahlweg, 2006)

The study before you intends to consider Clausewitz’s life and age and his eternal work of military strategy “On War”. In this connection, we will continue with studying nature of people’s war and come up with Clausewitzian nature of war, Clausewitzian trinity of subordination, chance and violence, Copernicus revolution of Clausewitz or the same continuation of war and politics and end up with disclosing the connection between war and politics in Clausewitz’s thought.

An In-Depth Review of Clausewitz’s “On War”

The study of military theories governing East and West will pave the ground well for carrying out comparative studies. Identifying the theoretical foundations hidden in the outstanding military works will help deeper understanding of the motives behind military behavior in various countries. Such an understanding serves as a rational and interpretive backup for the relations emerging from competition and confrontation, and at the same time facilitates situation analysis of probable warring and competition scenes. Clausewitz’s “On War” has gained a topnotch status among outstanding military works in the West.(Clausewitz, 2006) On War is one of the best and novel works on warfare in the 19th century and its importance has been always on the rise. The book is in full conformity with our time in presenting warfare issues and methodical review of the related issues. Carter and Muir in
their “List of World-Changing Books” have studied the 1000-page book of Clausewitz, On War, saying it has a unique status among all military works in all ages and nations. The book reviews the general principles of war completely and comprehensively, for which it has been praised as the one of the best works with in-depth study of the philosophy of war. The status of On War among military works has never been challenged. The First and Second World Wars, Korea War, various instances of Cold War, Vietnam War, and the conflicts between Arabs and Israel are solid evidences for the authenticity of some theories presented in this book. The challenges some one and a half centuries ago in Clausewitz’s mind are being discussed now. (Hahlweg, 2006)

These details and anticipations have made American strategist and thinker Bernard Brodie to say “On War is not simply the greatest, but the only great book about war.” It is difficult to oppose this idea. Anyone with a collection of military theories comparable with the wars on social, political or economic issues will find out it is difficult to compete with Clausewitz. Little in number is authors who could put behind political or technological restrictions in their time to present such a masterpiece. An example could be only Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War” probably written in the 4th century BC. Jomini, a contemporary of Clausewitz, has written a few chapters on war, while Liddell Hart’s works, too, have sparse and scattered phrases on war. We can also find interesting materials on war in the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. Among veteran authors on war, the views of Thucydides and Machiavelli are more or less worthy of instruction but we do not have a disciplined and coherent research work comparable with Clausewitz’s works. This is because military analysts have more given advice to the contemporaries and societies instead of teaching something eternal for the coming generations. (Howard, 1998) Clausewitz’s thoughts and his On War were to some degree studied through the works written by Raymond Aron, Edward Earle, Michael Howard and Pater Paret. Perhaps these authors have paid attention to Clausewitz’s works because of the direct link between the art of war and the art of politics in his thought. Clausewitz in his book continues Machiavelli’s thought and manner in a way. In other words, the importance of politics in Clausewitz’s theory is comparable to Machiavelli’s thought on war. Machiavelli viewed war in a subordinate position to policy and Clausewitz, following him, says politics is the major cause of war.

“As such Machiavelli is the interpreter of politics in the modern era who has pictured the spirit of his time in his books "The Prince" and the "Discourses", Clausewitz in his turn gives an interpretation of French Revolution and the Napoleon Wars masterly manifested in his book On War. The book gives centrality to the concept of politics in war.” (Jahanbagloo, 1999)

It was because of the discussions expressed in the On War that warmonger strategists showed great interest in the book and in Clausewitz’s thoughts. (Snyder, 1999) In the meantime, Jomini and Clausewitz have been recognized as the intellectual fathers of modern strategy. Today, Clausewitz is the most famous and highly recognized source for war and strategy, while Jomini’s name was synonymous with military wisdom. A precise comparison of Jomini’s “Summary of the Art of War” with Clausewitz’s On War shows major military doctrine is available considerably in both works. (Malik, 2005) Under the influence of French Revolution, Clausewitz’s strategy rests upon three pillars of people, government and army. He says in evaluation of big issues one must not be doubtful. (Gary, 2006)

**People’s War in Clausewitz’s thought**
A key concept in Clausewitz’s thought is this that we principally do not initiate any war. In other words, we must not be the initiator of any war by the rule of wisdom unless we ask ourselves what goal we are seeking to achieve with the outset of war. The answer to this question determines the amount of tools and the number of forces and also affects even the most trivial element of the operations. (Munkler, 2005)

On the opposite, while Jomini expressed his hatred of the concepts of civil war and people’s war, Clausewitz opined that people’s wars will be more effective if they are carried out in relation with the operations of a disciplined army. Critics believe that Jomini intended to ignore the historical evidence on this phenomenon that was against his theories in his “Scientific Theory of War”, therefore, his silence on civil wars is a solid evidence for this claim. In civil war the enemy is everywhere, but seen nowhere at the same time, therefore, it is difficult to identify the decisive point, i.e. the point against which vast repeated attacks must be focused. (Malik, 2005)

People’s war, as Clausewitz recognizes – that was ascertained by the awakening of modern nationalism in Europe – is a rural war of national resistance against foreign enemy. This notion distinguishes his views from the opinions of later thinkers of revolutionary wars.

Clausewitz and Laurence stand against Marx, Lenin, Mao, Giap, and Che Guevara who consider guerilla fights synonymous with people and revolutionary wars against the tyrant regimes. The major issue, for Clausewitz however, is the resistance and fight against foreign invasion and freedom from subordination. His opponents find fault with him in political and military grounds; in political ground, people’s war is a tool for revolution that results in civil chaos and threatens social order more than imposing danger on the enemy. In military ground, they say the results are not eye-catching in comparison with the amount of energy spent; therefore, it is not useful.

Responding his critics, Clausewitz says that from political point of view, people’s uprising is usually realized when ceaseless violence out of war destroys the ordinary structure and situation all at once. Intensification of civil unrest will automatically expose the society to a warring situation. Therefore, the collapse of soldier recruitment system and weakened army will encourage equipping people with arms. This will boost national power substantially so that the opponents of people’s war will deem it appropriate and workable. It is based on these considerations that Clausewitz writes people’s war in a correct method that if a nation uses it as a rule in an appropriate way, it will gain superiority over others. In response to the critics who say resources spent on general uprising can be used in other instances of war, he writes: as a matter of fact, these resources are neither accessible for the other instances of war, nor can they be readied when needed. The psychological element, that is highly important in these battles, can be seriously taken into effect in this specific occasion. (Karami, 1998)

According to Clausewitz, people’s war has certain features that distinguish it from any other war. Some of these features are the size of military units, number of people, its relation with the military strategy and disciplined army and finally reactionary capacity and expandability of the fight.

Clausewitz considers certain preconditions for efficiency of people’s war: people's war must be carried out inside the country; people’s uprising must not be broken apart by a single shock only; the operation scene must be vast enough; national features and specifications must be appropriate for people’s war; the land used for people’s war must not be inaccessible and farfetched.

Clausewitz has studied people’s war in two levels of strategy and tactics. In strategy level, people’s war is the last stage in which people are used to save the country and the government from
foreign invasion and rule in the period of occupation. This is an operation strategy within common military framework to safeguard the existing political condition. His people’s war, indeed, is a dependent operational strategy which is at the same time politically conservative. The later thinkers and authors, however, view people’s war as a military strategy independent from ordinary military framework, and from the political point of view, they view it as a revolutionary act. In terms of tactics, popular forces must use simple and light weaponry, scatter all across the country, attack the enemy from behind without forming a front or initiating a counterattack, and hide themselves in the arduous and hard-to-pass areas. This was introduced later by Che Guevara and others under “Foco Theory”. (Karami, 1998)

**Clausewitzian Nature of War**

Clausewitz primarily sees the nature and concept of war as a face-to-face combat and with a philosophical approach says it is a basis for rationalization. To him, war must be always subordinate to policy and serve as a means to a political end not moral evaluation. Clausewitz has no references to just and unjust wars and he has left this issue to the philosophers of war. War, as social life element, is under the influence of political maneuvers and manipulations that determine the goal, approach and influential forces. He has generally considered two forms of war: total annihilation of the enemy and merely limited war. There are no boundaries for each of course and both must be studied according to their disparate nature. (Hahlweg, 2006) The most important aspect of war in Clausewitzian view is its dual nature not a bipolar concept to say wars are either limited or unlimited. The concept has been taken from the philosophical tradition of Germany according to which phenomena possess objective and subjective natures. (Achevarria, 2002)

Paret, in quite contradictory approach, presents a more accurate view on Clausewitzian theory:

“A second contemplation on Clausewitz’s theories removes all misunderstandings on his work, and at the same time, gives out a reliable and sustainable concept for the 21st century. The most important aspect of Clausewitz’s view on war has been neglected. War has a dual character. Such a duality does not come from the bipolar concept of limited or unlimited war; rather it comes from the philosophical traditions of Germany that consider subjective and objective nature for any phenomenon.”(Paret, 2007)

The objective nature attests to those aspects of the phenomenon that are valid globally and the subjective nature finds meaning in specific time and place. The objective nature of war includes such elements as violence, friction, chance (opportunity), and uncertainty that are common in all wars irrespective of time and place. It contains large-scale conflicts from all-out attacks to peacekeeping but the above-said elements are present in these conflicts in different degrees. Subjective nature of war, on the other hand, encompasses such elements as military forces, doctrines, ammunitions and warring environments that make any war unique. To understand this structure well, we can consider the objective elements as the internal elements and the subjective elements as the external ones. Battles on the sea are different from the battles on the ground in terms of external factors, but they are similar in terms of internal factors. The participation of military forces, the use of ammunitions, new tactics and techniques like what was used in the 30-year wars since 1940 in Europe, can change the face of the battle.

According to Clausewitzian theory, the subjective and objective natures of war are
intertwined. For instance, the new tactics and ammunitions can decrease or increase the degree of violence or lack of certainty but they do not eliminate them at all. (Shahbazi, 2008) Therefore, the political motives behind war can lead to application of new ammunitions or tactics. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a number of pacts to prevent the eruption of nuclear war. Thus, there is always a dynamic interaction between subjective and objective natures of war.

According to Clausewitz, the objective and subjective nature of war present it something beyond a chameleon that changes its nature relatively. A chameleon changes its color to adapt its characteristics to the given case but its internal organs remain unchanged. The internal tendencies of war can change in view of intensity, the degree of involvement and relative role, and these changes can take place along with the developments in external features of war. Therefore, the nature of war cannot be separated from the means and players under the Clausewitzian system. (Shahbazi, 2008) Clausewitz in his “On War” has reviewed the different nature of wars in a separate entry:

“The greater and more powerful the motives of a war, the more it affects the whole existence of a people, the more violent the excitement which precedes the war, by so much the nearer will the war approach to its abstract form, so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy, so much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide, so much the more purely military and less political the war appears to be; but the weaker the motives and the tensions, so much the less will the natural direction of the military element—that is, force—be coincident with the direction which the political element indicates; so much the more must therefore the war become diverted from its natural direction, the political object diverge from the aim of an ideal war, and the war appear to become political.” (Clausewitz, 2006)

According to him, the subjective nature of war, like its objective nature, changes war into a type of “game” and any use of calculations in war not only fails to bring success in war, but also likens it into a “gamble and gambling game”. Although courage in war is a kind of prudent calculation, it is quite different from abstract calculation. He has put the idea in the following way:

“If we now take a look at the subjective nature of war, which is at those powers with which it is carried on, it will appear to us still more like a game. The element in which the operations of war are carried on is danger; but which of all the moral qualities is the first in danger? Courage. Now certainly courage is quite compatible with prudent calculation, but still they are things of quite a different kind, essentially different qualities of the mind; on the other hand, daring reliance on good fortune, boldness, rashness, are only expressions of courage, and all these propensities of the mind look for the fortuitous (or accidental), because it is their element.” (Clausewitz, 2006)

Copernicus Revolution of Clausewitz; War-Politics Relations

The relationship between politics and war is the cause of Clausewitz’s entry into the strategy, known today as Copernicus Revolution of Clausewitz in war and strategy. Clausewitz initiates his revolution by saying: “The final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered state often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations.” In this case, war has not advanced according to theory and it is not subject to absolute rules, rather it is subject to the law of probability. (Hosseini, 1994)

The sentence “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means” needs elaboration more
than other sentences because it expresses the core of the Clausewitzian thought. Politik in German means diplomacy and politics. There is a difference between the two because the first is a product and the latter is a procedure. Such a difference is not seen, however, in English translations. Clausewitz’s use of politik is both subjective and objective. In its subjective term, politik means expansion of the domineering will through official and unofficial decision-making procedure for realization of a goal. In its objective term, politik means certain diplomacy or the real manifestation of politics that changes from element to element and from people to people according to the penetration of culture, ideology, geography, tradition, personality and skill. Therefore, politik for Clausewitz is something beyond pure diplomacy or logical calculation of goals and methods. He uses the word as an art indeed in which human judgment, which is under the influence of internal specifications of mind and personality, becomes involved. Clausewitz continues that politik was influential in the domineering and expansion wars of Napoleon, just like the barbarian tribal wars. Although the political aims of barbarian tribes are less complicated than Napoleon politics, they possess similar factors. For instance, barbarian wars made use of existing resources (methods), geopolitical situation of tribes as a combination of Mongolian and Turkish tribes in Central Asia, traditions and the culture of living in tents, and the influence of religion. Therefore, Clausewitz’s use of the world politik is an indicator of the common strong and weak points of people to encompass resources, unity, pact, decision-making procedures, skill and personality of the policymakers. It is to some degree similar to the world culture for Kigan. (Achevarria, 2006) Clausewitz gives priority to politics, i.e. the political nature of war, and in his note on German armed forces makes a deduction that war is a political indicator: It is a grave mistake to consider war an independent affair that must be judged through certain rules and its political indicators must be looked upon as exceptional states. Rather, we should say that war is not apart from politics. Somewhere Clausewitz corrects the last sentence in his drafts immediately and says that it is useless to judge about war from a pure military point of view. There is always a policy behind every war and war is a means of realizing political end. Politics determines the major guidelines in every war. (Hahlweg, 2006) From Clausewitz’s point of view, if a policy turns to be strong and magnificent, the resulting war will be also magnificent and in its turning point it will be absolute to lead us toward the connection between war and politics.

When we decided on the objectives behind war and when we distinguished real war from absolute war, we must study the goals with an emphasis on political aims. What is the nature of such an influence? It is instrumental nature. Military force is a tool in the hands of power used for realization of political aims. In other words, politics shapes up war and makes decision on its content. This is why war has no place in science and art and it is considered in social sciences only. The governments use the power of these two institutions or violence to realize their political interests. Therefore, according to Clausewitz, war is an absolute subordinate of politics while the opposite is not true. Since cause determines effect, it cannot be a subordinate itself. This is why any war is political but any policy, however hostile, is not an indicator of war. In other words, war is not something other than a tool at the service of wisdom that moves hostility from paper to battlefield. Therefore, any act by this tool will have no result except application of political wisdom in such a way that the cause for any intervening act in practice is the change in the use of political wisdom. As a result, guiding war is the same politics that has changed pen with a sword. (Jahanbagloo, 1999) Clausewitz’s deduction of war is like continuation of the
policies in the fourth dimension of war, civil war and the civil war outside frontiers – that has increasingly substituted foreign and international wars in modern-day world. This deduction seems to be more appropriate than any time.

It is necessary to contemplate on the structures, plans and achievements of the world guerilla movements such as the movements by colored nations in the underdeveloped nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We must also restudy guerilla wars as influential revolutionary movements (with national motives on occasion) in relation with the class clashes taken place to change the existing social system according to socialistic and imperialistic conflicts in the world. In other words, the link between politics and war is closer in guerilla battles. This form of war is practically politics and a product of sociopolitical movement in close association with economic conditions. In this sense, Clausewitz’s remarks gain double significance because it has been proved that renowned strategists of guerilla wars are quite familiar with his intellectual basis. Moreover, his views can be used in the majority of modern-day limited wars in case they remain limited in terms of motives, goals and global connections. (Hahlweg, 2006) Clausewitz has made the political nature of war sustainable by saying that war is an instrument for realizing an aim, but it shall not be the aim itself. Therefore, when the aim is realized the war should be terminated.

In other words, the existence of a perfect connection and solidarity between politics and war is a major hypothesis toward understanding Clausewitzian school of war. Perhaps, it is the reason why in the age of democracy he is more popular than Jomini. The lasting validity of the classic strategists can be observed in 1991 Persian Gulf War where war was a subordinate of political ends. In contradiction with General Schwarzkopf’s recommendations, U.S. president selected political end to terminate the war. The coalition forces did not want to augment pressure to annihilate Iraqi forces totally and oust their leader. If Clausewitz lived to see the war, he would definitely support George Bush’s decision. (Snyder, 2005) Clausewitz’s definition of war has been more exactly redefined by Lenin. He said war is continuation of and means for politics by a certain class of society by using violent military tools. Appropriate and realistic interpretations on war still insist on the use of force. In the age of atomic weapons, there is still discussion on war and its authenticity or abolition. For instance, Dutch peace researcher Rolling believes that in the case of total atomic war, the war Clausewitz refers to as “continuation of politics by other means” will be unimaginable in practice. According to Rolling, only a limited war can be called Clausewitzian war, however, the risk of expansion of this war will be so great that wise governments will never initiate such a war.

Socialists, too, ask themselves whether inevitable consequences of missile and nuclear world war will leave any ground to think war is continuation of a certain policy or such a war will put an end to any policy. Lenin has responded to this question by considering conditions and preconditions for Clausewitz’s sentence according to the existing conditions. Lenin explains that missile and nuclear war cannot be continuation of politics because of the vastness of destruction, rather it will help elimination of economic, social and political causes of war and will place it among unimaginable supernatural phenomena. Modern level war, like any other war, is indeed continuation of a certain policy, i.e. power policy of the imperialistic forces who intend to destroy the world socialist order and establish imperialistic unity in the world. (Hahlweg, 2006)

Clausewitzian Trinity of War

For Clausewitz, a real war is made of three factors known as the dominant tendencies: people (manifesting violence, sentiments and
enforcement of popular will), army (indicator of reciprocal impact of chance and instability that are both key features of military operation) and government (indicator of the importance of politics in selecting the goals, allocation of tools, controlling gradual increase in intensity and vastness of war). This is why Clausewitz viewed war from its horrible and melancholic aspects, saying there is always the risk of war getting out of the control of human being. (Malik, 2005) Clausewitz explains trinity of war in the following way:

“War is more than a mere chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a fascinating trinity - composed of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; (2) of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and (3) of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason.

The first of these three aspects more concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.” (Clausewitz, 2006) Clausewitzian trinity of war comprises of the following indicators:

A. Subordination; War as a Political Means

According to Clausewitz, courage is an inherent feature and no one can acquire it later. Courage governs the army only at the cost of renewal of will. It takes the backing role in war in front of hundreds of thousands of anxiety-stricken sentiments, only a few of them are optimistic. Courage and perseverance of the commander are not alone enough to gain victory in the war; rather, he must know how to apply superiority of forces to gain victory. In this sense, victory will be gained only when forces are concentrated in a certain point of battle. (Jahanbagloo, 1999)

Now the question is how can one exert influence on probability of success? It is clear that success in the first stage depends upon the same factors that impose defeat on the enemy, i.e. destroy enemy’s military forces and capture his land. These two, however, do not have equal importance in the probability of success. When we attack the enemy, it is totally a different tendency to completely destroy the enemy warfare through series of nonstop attacks, or gain a temporary victory to take sense of security away from the enemy, impose our superiority and picture a gloomy future for the enemy. The special means for boosting probability of success for a goal other than destruction of the enemy army is an act with direct link to politics. If we manage to disperse the allied forces, make them inactive or add them to our allied forces, or if we turn political means in our favor, we have simply boosted the probability of success in our favor. This is a relative shortcut to us instead of surrendering the enemy’s military force. (Clausewitz, 2006)

B. Enmity; Blind Natural Force

Despite the fact that all religions and ethical systems have been founded based on respect to human life, and although all of them condemn massacre as a solution to settle the disputes in human societies, killing soldiers and civilians in masses is considered legitimate and even lauded
in some contemporary cultures. This is regarded as a laudable act in line with safeguarding national interests and realizing diplomatic goals.

In the course of history, enmity and violence – like poverty – have been always present in human societies. The experience of Winston Smith in George Orwell’s 1984 can be repeated at any age of the human history. In response to this historical complex, humanists tend to Konrad Lorenz who says the instinct of war and invasion can be easily satisfied with substituted goals than any other instincts. This is what the Greek refer to it as Katharsis (Catharsis). To prove their innocent claim, by virtue of historical survey of enmity, they say sport is a type of war that has been gradually transformed among human beings. Pragmatists and farsighted people, however, follow Hegel who said what we learn from history is this that people and governments learn nothing from history. (Howard, 1998) At any rate, Clausewitz considers enmity or violence as an inseparable part of war calculation, where he writes:

“War, therefore, is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory.” (Clausewitz, 2006)

Clausewitz says fights erupt among human beings for two reasons: the hostile feeling and the hostile view. He writes:

“The fight between men consists really of two different elements, the hostile feeling and the hostile view. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events, by any extreme hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilized nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this difference is not inherent in a state of barbarism, and in a state of culture in themselves it arises from attendant circumstances, and existing institutions.” (Clausewitz, 2006)

C. Chance and Uncertainty; Military Force

Clausewitz says superior forces have always the best chance for victory in war. (Howard, 1998) Chance and lack of certainty are manifested through traditional organizations in the course of development, military forces and law-enforcing institutions. (Achevarria, 2006) On the other hand, chance and uncertainty in view of the non-governmental players are discerned in the form of undisciplined forces.

The major elements of undisciplined forces are religious ideology, operational and organizational substructures and multifaceted membership. Whereas information technologies offer more data to the decision-makers, such data will be useless
without analysis and synthesis. The amount of data – including irrelevant and incorrect – might be increased at any time. At the same time, increased awareness depends upon increased data. Globalization boosts the role of politics in war and its real and immediate control of military operations. Globalization has augmented the importance of enmity and political leaders can make use of increased enmity sentiments to mobilize people faster and vaster. Finally, the increased access to information in the course of globalization has intensified the roles of chance and uncertainty in war. Shahbazi, 2008 In other words, Clausewitz believes that timidity must be put aside before decision-making process in order to act decisively. In this course chance might be helpful. This might be a mistake along with information screening of course. At any rate, decision-making in war is coupled with chance and uncertainty, as he says:

“Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give. In a few words, most reports are false, and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier of lies and untruths. Individuals must try in full capacity to overcome timidity and move toward hope.” (Clausewitz, 2006)

Commanders and military officers, after putting aside timidity of selecting the right information, make their decisions, but soon they will find out the decision is not absolute and it is the chance that brings success or lack of success.

Conclusion

Many thinkers and theorists have written great works on war and strategy but a few of them have managed to produce a thought for future generations and go beyond the issues of their time. Among them, a military philosopher and theorist named Clausewitz could produce his magnum opus “On War” based on his numerous practical experiences and regular studies. Although he could not duly rise to fame in his time, the passage of time and the developments he had already anticipated gave deserving credence to him. His living environment, the wars happened in his time, and the military roles he played had greatly impressed Clausewitz’s strategic thought. His theories on war have both proponents and opponents, but criticisms have not devalued him. He is still considered one of the preponderant supporters of continental school of military sciences who has created or redefined new concepts of war and strategy such as center of gravity, friction, chance, opportunity and the like. Clausewitz is among those warmonger strategists with relative proximity to Jomini’s opinions and at the same time impressed by Hegel’s thought. Clausewitz describes was as a face-to-face battle with dual nature of subjective and objective aspects. He says strategy and tactic are important in war and considers them as the art of war, but gives superiority to strategy. His term friction was a great help to strategic thought on war. He has placed special emphasis on people’s war and unlike his contemporary thinkers and strategists, while accepting some preconditions, he regarded people’s war as a national resistance that shall replace national military forces. Among his lasting theories we can refer to the strong connection between politics and war, known as Copernicus revolution. He claims war is a dependent entity and subordinate of politics in such a way that strong and weak politics shall affect war substantially. Clausewitz said a real war had three major elements of chance and opportunity, enmity and violence as natural factors, and subordination and victory, each constituting a major part of his trinity of war.
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