

The Dialectics of Globalization and the Rise of Populism: Selected Issues in Perspective

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Received: 18 March 2017 ; Accepted: 20 Jan 2018

Abstract:

This paper examines the dialectical nature of globalization and the rise of populism in contemporary world politics. Unequivocally, the subject of globalization has become one of the preponderant issues in the 21st century. Using Library Research Methods, the paper scrutinizes the inherent contradictions in the globalized world alongside the resurgence of populism in the developed world. This work contends that the new wave of protectionism and populism by the engineers and architects of globalization repudiates the logic of globalization and is itself contradictory. It finds that the unprecedented backlash of globalization serves populist individuals and groups as a tangible claim to justify their anti-global aspirations in appealing to the people against established global agents and institutions. It concludes that, although the backlash of globalization has been used by ambitious populists to promise a quick fix, the increasing vulnerability of the international system cannot be resolved by clinging to national pedigrees as the ultimate solution. The problems and challenges of current globalization are problems without passport and demand solutions beyond borders through the same logic of globalization. It recommends the realization of sustainable development goals as a reasonable point of departure for national, regional and international bodies.

Keywords: Dialectics; Globalization; Populism; Brexit; Trumpism

Introduction

The contemporary international system bears the stamp of a global village, in which

socio-cultural political and economic affairs in one part of the globe influence happenings at another end. The fostering of greater con-

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nectivity and interdependence among nations of the world formed the premise for the shift towards a global village (Jones, 2010). The advancement of science and technology, and the resultant increment in trans-border communication, the expansion of international capital mobility and increased international division of labour optimized the process of globalization (Kalb, 2000). The concept has turned out to be one of the preponderate themes in current time, resonating differently among scholars as representing political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental substances.

Although there are debates as to the age of globalization among extant literature, it is arguable that the modern form of globalization which hinges on neo-liberal ideology and value is not unconnected to the demise of communism and the setting in of the Americanization process. America's mission to instil a new world order after the Cold-War, culminating in the Americanization of the world as postulated by Fukuyama (1992) in his End of History thesis (that with the global triumph of political and economic liberalism, democracy and capitalism thus become the defining moments in history) engineered the contemporary international structure characterized by neo-liberal values and orientations.

However, recent incidence in global politics reveals a contradiction in which the engineers and master-minders of the contemporary global order have begun to doubt the sustainability of the unrestrained and interconnected world as outlined by the logic of neo-liberalism. The engineers of the current global project are beginning to admire the necessity of withdrawing from the global project. This, in part, is due to the unprece-

dent backslash of the interpenetration project and the unintended challenges presented by the borderless world, which are seen as threats to the sustainability of the socio-economic and political development of these states.

This work contends that the new wave of protectionism and populism by the engineers and architects of globalization repudiates the logic of globalization and is itself contradictory. It examines the dialectics of globalization and the rise of populism by interrogating the recent happening in global politics to verify its bearing of the trappings of another end of history, a clash of civilizations or a clash of globalization, using the selected cases of Brexit and Trumpism. It consists of five parts: the introduction, the conceptualization, the dialectical nature of globalization, the selected cases of Brexit and Trumpism and a conclusion.

Literature Review and Conceptualizations Globalization

Globalization is a concept and a phenomenon. It has attracted various definitions from scholars as representing political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental substances. It is a multi-dimensional concept which suggests interpenetration and interdependency in socio-cultural, political, economic and security areas of human endeavour; it repudiates isolationism and protectionism (Chidozie & Aje, 2017). The contentious nature of globalization was corroborated by Dicken (2007:3) when he regards the term as 'one of the most used, but also one of the most misused...and most confused words' in today's world. Scholte (1995) notes that 'globalization stands out for quite a large public spread across the world as one of the defining terms

of late twentieth-century social consciousness' (Scholte, 1995).

The World Bank defines globalization as 'the global circulation of goods, services and capital but also of information, ideas and people' (World Bank, 2000, p. 3). This implies that the world has no boundaries and geography has become irrelevant. People now move freely across different countries in search of better livelihood. Global challenges now attract the sharing of ideas across borders, while close monitoring and commentary are placed on events around the globe as they occur.

Castells (1996:92) sees globalization as 'an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale'. It is an instrument that harmonizes the world beyond borders, relating the political, economic, social and even cultural aspects of different countries into one, as a network that stretches across national borders.

Globalization signifies modernity, this was the perspective suggested by Giddens when he defines it 'as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice-versa' (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Linking globalization to the process of modernity, he insists that globalizing is inherent in modernity and 'is evident in some of the basic characteristics of modern institutions, particularly their disembeddedness and reflexivity' (Giddens, 1990, p. 63). He further asserts that modernity is the transformative form of social life.

Some scholars see globalization as a concept that relates to anything outside the economic domain. These scholars try to provide a holistic definition for the term. Held et.al (1999:2) ambiguously defines it as 'the

widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, financial to the spiritual'. This definition rejects the term as restricted to a particular aspect of human endeavour, on the contrary, it is connected with the whole. Dicken (2007:8) notes that globalization is 'not a single unified phenomenon, but a syndrome of processes and activities'. This processes and activities are spatial, intertwined and woven together, thereby the global and local intermesh.

Globalization signifies a progressive change and movement towards a new international system characterised by integration as its central attribute, it is seen as an ongoing process that leads to the inevitable integration of markets in contrast to the dividing era observed in the pre-war era (Friedman, 1999). The arguments about the merit and demerit of globalization populate extant literature, but the summary of these arguments is that 'globalization has the potential to bring enormous benefits to those in both the developing and the developed world...[however] it has failed to live up to its potential' (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 4).

Globalization Debate

The concept of globalization has supplanted a line of division between its critics and supporters. The debate seeks to explain the dividing lines as to how globalization affects nations and lives of billions of people in the world. The origin of these debates is not well documented but arguments about the concept seem to have flourished rather suddenly in the early 1990s (Bisley, 2007, p. 11). Bisley further gave an example to the phases of the debate on globalization as follows:

Table 1.
Evolution of Globalization Debate

Phase of debate	Characteristics	Examples
Late 1980s	Globalization identified as a process driving radical change in the social realm	Giddens (1990), Harvey (1989), Featherstone (1990), Luard (1990)
Early to mid-1990s	Claims about globalization amplified, they became increasingly mainstream and key lines of contestation emerged	Ohmae (1995), Giddens (1994), Camileri and Falk (1992), Albrow (1996), Scholte (1993)
Late 1990s	Central claims about globalization were theoretically, empirically and politically challenged	Weiss (1998), Garrett (1998), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Rodrik (1997), Hoogvelt (1997)
Early 2000s	Consolidation of globalization through parameter setting studies and as a site of political contestation	Held et al (1999), Scholte (2000), Castells (1996, 1997, 1998), Klein (2000), Stiglitz (2002)
Mid 2000s	Merits of globalization overtly defended in the face of the critics	Bhagwati (2004), Wolf (2004), Legrain (2002), Friedman (2005)

Table 1. Source: (Bisley, 2007, p. 11)

The debate about globalization has three major dividing lines or schools of thought which are:

Globalists or HyperGlobalizers

This school of thought has scholars such as Kenichi Ohmae (1995), Manuel Castells (2006), Peter Dicken (1992), Thomas Friedman (1999). This perspective insists that globalization is a powerful transformative force in human existence and history. It maintains that a borderless world, where economic activities are denationalized, is inevitable.

In this view, the ascendancy of market forces and the redundancy of the state are beneficial. Ohmae (1995: XIV), posits thus:

As private sector managers and government policymakers are discovering, it makes no sense in so borderless a world to think, say, of countries like 'Italy' or 'China' as discrete economic entities. Their internal variations are too great, and their external linkages are too expensive for such slipshod generalizations to be useful as guides to action. Equally important, the sheer speed of business-related migration

through the digital network now vastly outpaces the ability of governments—both leaders and institutions—to adapt and respond. Left to their own devices, governments simply cannot move quickly enough to build prosperity for their people.

The globalists insist that 'the process of globalization slices through the political authority of nation-states. Indifferent to national borders, globalization transforms not only economic mechanism but also political power and cultural patterns' (Lemert, Elliott, Chaffee, & Hsu, 2010, p. 205).

Anti-Globalists or Sceptics

Commentators like Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1999), Naomi Klein (2004), Robert Gilpin (2000), Barry Jones (1995) constitute this school of thought. They argue that although globalization promises a lot of things, it still remains a fallacy. Hirst and Thompson posit that globalization is a necessary myth which does amount to the internationalization of the world economy. Anti-globalists question the supposed benefit of globalization and demand evidence to show

that the world has actually become more integrated than it used to be. Arguing further, Hirst and Thompson (1999:2-3) note that:

- i. genuinely transnational companies appear to be relatively rare while most companies are based nationally and trade transnationally on the strength of major national location of assets, production and sales.
- ii. capital mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment from the advanced to the developing economies, instead, foreign direct investment is highly concentrated among advanced industrial economies and the developing world remains marginal in both investment and trade.
- iii. the world economy is far from being genuinely global, rather, trade investments and financial flows are all concentrated in the trade of Europe, Japan and North America and this dominance is certain to continue.
- iv. the three major economic powers (G3) have the capacity to coordinate policy and to exert powerful governance pressures over financial markets and other economic tendencies.

- v. The present highly internationalized economy is unprecedented.

Transformationalists

This school of thought sees globalization as the driving force which accounts for the rapid political, economic and social changes that are currently reshaping modern societies and the world order. This is a middle ground position to the other schools of thought. The transformationalist viewpoint centres on Giddens' submission that globalization is a powerful transformative force, leading to a massive shake-up of societies, economies, institutions of governance and world order (Giddens, 1990). In contrast to the globalist view which insists on the redundancy of states capability and power, transformationalist avers that state's capability and power are undergoing reorganization and reconfiguration as a result of the complex nature of governance in today's world. Giddens identifies four forces that shape globalization - the world capitalist economy, world military order, international division of labour and nation-state system. These forces have helped the advanced capitalist states take the lead in the world.

Tadi (2006) gave the summary of the central assumptions of the globalists and the anti-globalists as follows:

Table 2.
The Main Points of the Globalists and the Sceptics

Serial Number		Globalist	Globalist	Sceptics
		Radical	Moderate	
I	Conceptualization	A new era	A contingent and contradictory historical process	Nothing new; ideology and myth
II	Main Causes	Laissez-faire capitalism and technology	Combined forces of modernity	Project of the West
	Main Consequence			
III	Economical	New global economy	Post-industrial economy	internationalization of economy

	Political	The end of state; global government	Reconstruction and restructuring of state power	States are more powerful than ever
	Cultural	Homogenization	Hybridization	Fragmentation
IV	Future Prediction	The end of history, global civilization	Indeterminism	Clash of civilizations

Table 2: (Tadi, 2006, p. 187).

The Concept of Populism

Populism is a completely fluid term that has specific meaning in specific discourses. Most scholars agree that populist movement is ‘of the people but not of the system’ (Taggart, 1996, p. 32). It is a change against the established status quo in the name of the people or by the people. Its conceptualization includes political, social and economic discursive features arising from the economic and social crisis (Weyland, 2001, p. 1). Populist hostility not only targets the political, economic, social and cultural spheres but also the public opinion of the media. This was Canovan’s (1999:2) opinion of Populism, understood as ‘an appeal to the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values. Gellner and Ionescu (1969: 1) in Gidron&Bonikowski (2013:3) note that: by way of offering a far-reaching analysis of the word There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is.

As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? Or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?

Just as globalization cuts across borders, so does populism. The concept represents opinions, political movements, paradigm shift, social revolutions across boundaries. Populism has three main conceptual approaches; populism as an ideology, populism

as a discursive style and as a tool for political mobilization.

Populism as an Ideology

Cas Mudde defines populism as ‘a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the poor people versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ in which politics represent an expression of the ‘volontégénérale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Populism, from this definition, is firstly an idea characterized by the rivalry between the people and the elites while insisting that politics should reflect the general consent of the people. As a thin-centred ideology, populism reflects in party's documents, manifestoes, literature and the speeches of political actors which are the primary units of analysis (Mudde, 2004).

Populism as a Discursive Style

Populism in another context constitutes pretentious, fine-sounding, and persuasive talks. Kazin (1995) observes that it is a concept of ‘us’ and it explicitly represents the majority of the people. Kazin (1995) argues that American populism, for example, is always based on the differences between us and them. Deegan-Krause, Kelvin and Haughton (2009: 822) insist that populism differs from an ideology, rather it represents political talk instead of the idiosyncrasy of the political actor. Accordingly, it “shifts our assessments from the binary opposition—a party is popu-

list or not—to a matter of degree—a party has more populist characteristics or fewer”.

Populism as a Political Mobilization

This approach emphasizes populism as a political strategy of mass mobilization which aims at nationalization and redistribution of economic wealth. It is anti-elitist, anti-tax and sometimes anti-integration scheme. Jansen defines populist mobilization as ‘any sustained, large-scale political project that mobi-

lizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorises ordinary people’ (2011, 82). It stresses the nationalist aspect, the ‘we feeling’ in the mobilization process and try to connect to the people empathically.

Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) gave the characterization of the three approaches to populism discussed above as follows:

Table 3.
Characteristics of the Three Approaches to Populism

	Definition of populism	Unit of analysis	Relevant methods	Exemplars
Political Ideology	A set of interrelated ideas about the nature of politics and society	Parties and party leaders	Qualitative or automated texts analysis, mostly of partisan literature	Mudde (2004, 2007), Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012)
Political Style	A way of making claim about politics; characteristics of the discourse.	Text, speeches, public discourse about politics	Interpretive textual analysis	Kazin (1995), Laclau (2005), Panizza (2005)
Political Strategy	A form of organization and mobilization	Parties (with a focus on structures), social movements, leaders	Comparative historical analysis, case studies	Roberts (2006), Wayland (2001), Jansen (2011)

Table 3: Source:(Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 17)

The Dialectical Nature of Globalization

With the increasing interconnectedness of the international system, some scholars and observers believe that the globalization trend is inevitable and irreversible; that in the coming years, the international system will become an advanced borderless world. However, scholars such as Harold James, Kevin O’Rourke, Zahra Egal and Andrew Sobel observe that the evolution of the international system has witnessed epochs of well-integrated international community which collapsed in itself under the pressure of unexpected or unprecedented events (Egal& Sobel, 2009; O’Rourke, 2009; James, 2002).

In Europe, for instance, the universalErasmian world of the Renaissance was destroyed by the Reformation, while its Catholic counterpart and separatism, provincialism, and parochialism followed. A more

immediate (and perhaps more familiar) precedence is the disintegration of the highly interconnected economic world of the late nineteenth century (James, 2002, p. 1).

Recognising that no one integrated international community is like other, James posits that unequivocally, no one collapse is precisely like another. To be sure, well-integrated international communities advanced until there ensued irreconcilable contradictions which nurtured the basis for their disintegration. The contradictions regarding the international community ascend from the ‘patterns of thought and institutional mechanisms that arise in response to a new and unfamiliar international or cosmopolitan world’. For example, the collapse of globalism in the interwar depression which destroyed the financial power of Great Britain, the ‘dynamic force behind the internationalization of the economy

in the nineteenth century', incited Japan and Nazi Germany to invent 'aggressive and exploitative approaches to a nationalist management of the economy' and they largely rejected the ideas and doctrines of globalism (Sobel, 2009; James, 2002). This form of reactionary resentment against globalism at certain points of the global project remains 'similar over long periods' (James, 2002, p. 1).

The continuous movement of the international community towards interpenetration, interconnectedness and a borderless empire carries within itself the possibility of disintegration as soon as there ensues irreconcilable contradictions. The globalized world system can be described as a project which contains, in itself, the grains of its own destruction. James identifies two alternate paths to the 'auto-destruction' of the globalized world: the first stems from an 'inherent flaw in the system itself'; the second is the reactions and responses generated by this flaw, 'in this account, fear disrupts globalization' (James, 2002, p. 2).

The first grain of 'auto-destruction' described above lies in the flaws and fault lines inherent in the global project. These contra-

dictions stem from the negativity and the backlash of the system: unwholesome movement both of human and non-human means of production.

Philip Martins dwells extensively on the ripple effects of migration as one of the inextricable fault-lines of contemporary globalism. Since globalization advocates interpenetration of both human and non-human resources, since it encourages the outsourcing of workers from beyond national borders, its resultant effect is the mass migration of people towards advanced political economies, attracted by socio-political and economic opportunities, accentuated by informational networks of family and friends already established in the advanced capitalist world (Martin, 2009).

To be sure, in the last few decades, there has been a revival of inequality in the advanced capitalist world, when measured in comparison to what obtains in the immediate aftermaths of the war eras (Huber & Stephens, 2009). Unequivocally, the resurgence of inequality in the advanced political economies increases with the acceleration of globalization (Huber & Stephens, 2009).

GDP per Capita Growth Rate, by Country Type, 1960s-1990s (%)




Figure 1. Source: Dollar (2005; 154)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/41261414?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Indeed, the migration in the early years of the post-cold war era aided the management of increasing labour shortage in many of the advanced capitalist economies whose workforce

stagnated as a result of decreasing birth rates (Martin, 2009).

Relying on history especially of the 19th century, Kevin O'Rourke posits that the pro-

cess of emigration offers opportunities for poor countries to enhance their standards of living. As people migrate from poorer countries into advanced political economies, real wages tend to rise as labour supply shrinks in those countries (O'Rourke, 2009). This gives the poor countries leverage to catch up with the developed countries and also, in the long run, it could destabilize the hitherto socio-economic opportunities enjoyed in the advanced political system, essentially because the emigrants compete with the indigenous people for jobs and other opportunities which are often limited. This cre-

ates tensions and mixed reactions from the citizens of the advanced political economies.

As evident in figure 1 above, the GDPs in the developing countries performed better than that of the developed countries after the 1990s when the contemporary globalization process began. Also, the level of inequality in the advanced political systems of United States, Canada and Europe have increased consistently between 1980 and 2015, while that of Africa, Brazil and Middle Eastern Countries have stabilized and remained consistent over time as shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2. Source: World Inequality Data-Base (2018:7)
<https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf>

Studying the attitude of elites and masses towards transnational trade, labour outsourcing and migration in the United States, Medina and Sobel (2009) discover that the elites embrace transnational trade, outsourcing and migration, perhaps because of their education, exposure and position in the society, whereas the masses feel threatened by 'the movement of labour, goods, and capital across border', hence, they invoke the 'conception of distinct national identity, us versus them' as a basis for anti-globalism.

There is also the argument which advances that globalization compels states to strive towards creating and sustaining favourable conditions merely to entice investors. This perspective insists that states are compelled to 'function primarily in the interests of global capital, rather than functioning for their citizens' (Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 117).

Although, in theory, these states advance that they work ultimately for their citizens, when measured against reality, Bourdieu concludes that the priority of these states is

primarily to assure investors interest while skilfully ignoring the interests of the poor and of the working classes (Bourdieu, 1998).

Similarly, Jean Baudrillard (1993) believes that the contradictions of globalisation make terrorism inevitable- it is 'the inevitable outcome of our world system' (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 128). According to Schirato and Webb (2003, p 41), 'the universalizing of 'us', and the exclusion of 'them'-do not come about without effects: they are tied up with a politics which many writers argue, leads inevitably to resistance' and in part gives impetus for terrorism. In the view of Pierre Bourdieu, modern terrorism is anchored 'in the despair of those excluded' cited in (Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 41). Although one cannot extensively agree that globalisation directly gives impetus to terrorism, it is safe to posit that the various components of globalization (advanced communication and technologies as well as free movement of people among others) have been instrumental for the continuous success of terrorism. Some citizens of the advanced capitalist world often blame terrorist activities in their countries on the uncontrolled migration from poor/developing states where terrorism finds a safe abode to nurture and launch its plans on the international community. The enduring question of terror attacks in the advanced capitalist world is blamed on the negligence of globalization – the free flow of human, arms and other resources.

In essence, the unprecedented backlash of globalization in current times have equally affected the engineers of the global project. This is inevitable because the advanced capitalist states failed to organize a realistic agenda. They overburdened trade talks with inappropriate demands about environmental and especially labour standards... while encouraging the

'apocalyptic street scenes in which citizens of mostly rich countries, who might have been expected to see themselves as beneficiaries of globalization, rioted against the new economic order' (James, 2002, p. 2).

Hence, the contradictions and backlash of globalization give support to populist movement across Europe and America with migration and terrorism as the fore issues. The reactions and responses generated by these flaws, bathed by fear and uncertainty in the emerging trends of globalization, are essentially the second pathway to 'auto-destruction' of globalisation advanced by James that 'fear disrupts globalization' (James, 2002, p. 2). Hence, within the context of reactionary resistance towards globalization by the engineers and advocates of the current global project, the dialectical nature of globalization finds expression.

Trumpism and Brexit: Evident Dialectics of Globalization

With the perceived imperfections and challenges posed by the forces of globalization, populism has become an inescapable reality and also a veritable political tool amongst right-wing radicals in Europe and America. The 'mainstream parties have not been able to develop strategies to effectively counter this populism' (Greven, 2016, p. 2).

Although, this right-wing populism appearing across the United States and Europe may manifest in different forms, there exist substantial similarities between them which centre on the 'juxtaposition of a (corrupt) political, class or establishment' and the granting of authentic voice to the people (Greven, 2016, p. 1).

The second similarity is based on the definition of the identity and interests of the people as culturally homogenous and distinct

from the identity of others, 'usually minorities such as migrants, which are supposedly favoured by the (corrupt) elite' (Greven, 2016, p. 1).

Fundamentally, the strategy and tactics used by right-wing populists are negative political communication, they invoke supposed 'political correctness' as a major theme in their discourse, often allowing the 'staging of calculated provocations and scandals, and of the breaking of supposed taboos, as this resonates with the needs of the media in terms of markets demands and the news cycle' (Greven, 2016, p. 1).

The aspirations and desires of populist groups in recent years (i.e withdrawal from the supranational organization, the hostility towards non-indigenes supposedly favoured by the establishment), are best exemplified in Britain's bid to exit the European Union and also in the political manifesto and administration of Trump's Presidency. Thus, the Brexit narrative and Trump's presidency represent the latest resurgence of populist aspirations in Europe and America - showcasing a new form of status quo ante. It represents a complex reality whereby the supposed losers from globalization find a fortress among individuals in the mainstream party who can help challenge existing establishment- 'the Republicans in the U.S., the Tory party in the U.K.' (Nolte, 2016).

Dionne, Pita and Stelzenmuller (2016) locate the reason for this growing development in America and the United Kingdom in the backlash of globalisation and technological change. Particularly, they argue on how economic grievances and political fragmentation justify the rise of populism in America and Europe. Judis (2016) explains that populism succeeds in U.S. and Europe when the public perceives that the dominant political norms defended and preserved by the existing estab-

lishment are inimical to their hopes, fears and concerns. Populists then ramp up these neglected worries, framing them in a manner that pits the people against an obdurate elite. By doing this, they become spontaneous agents for change. This explains why, majority of their supporters are usually those economically challenged, whose jobs and incomes are threatened by 'trade, globalization, migration and technology' (Roubini, 2016). Hence, anti-migration, anti-Islam, anti-trade, anti-EU, and anti-establishment are usually the mantra of populists who seek to gather the supposed losers of globalization.

This was essentially the case with the Brexit narrative where populists build upon the adverse effects of migrants on the socio-political and economic advancement of the Nation. These populist groups argue that globalisation and its tool (international organisation- the EU) are just a means of enriching Berlin with the economic, military and intelligent proceeds from Britain. The Vote Leave group, for example, insists that a vote to leave the European Union means an end to Britain's loyalty to the European Union, an end to the sending of over £ 350 million every week to the EU (Brown, 2015). Corroborating the Vote Leave Camp, the Leave EU group posits that by leaving the European Union, Britain will have more funds for domestic concerns, 'each household could be better off by this amount - through cheaper food bills, no membership fees, with the cost of regulations lifted, too' (Brown, 2015, p. 4).

They reject the unification of currency and reiterate the lessons of the Great Recession and are hostile to immigrants because they regard them as seedbeds of crime and ultimately of terrorism. They conclude that the reality of this is that unemployment rate and insecurity level have increased, and the nation has become more vulnerable than ever

before (Aje & Chidozie, 2018). Above all, the nation has lost its main sovereignty and respect within the comity of nations, thus, the Leave E.U. camp campaigns for the restoration of Britain sovereignty in order to ward off migrants and transborder threats. Accordingly, 'Imagine not having our laws dictated to us by Brussels. Instead, MPs would become accountable to the public and we would once again be able to make and decide our own laws. Imagine how we could then regain control of important issues such as our borders' (Brown, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, the call to exit the European Union is a call to make Britain 'great again' - a clarion call to ensure that Britain takes charge of its borders and tackles its security challenges independently without relying on orders from the Union.

Similarly, the campaign manifestoes that ushered in U.S. President Donald Trump built on the supposed negligence of the establishment; the repudiation of immigrants perceived as threats to national employment, security and development. It was observed that during the campaigns, Trump continually played on the racist opposition, while 'exploiting a latent sympathy for fascism among working-class white Americans' (Judis, 2016).

Essentially, he holds the view that, given the growing tensions of international terrorism, the admission of Muslims into the United States should be minimal and regulated if not holistically terminated. He believes that the multilateral concerns over climate issues are not really as serious as often described by the national and supranational establishment. To him, 'climate change is just a weather' and it should not be made so complicated as to disrupt or imperil national and transnational companies (BBC, 2016). Accordingly, the Paris Climate agreement, if adhered to, could

cost the United States over 2.5 trillion dollars and over 6.5 million jobs, while America's household income will reduce drastically (Varinsky, 2017). Perhaps that was a valid reason for exiting the Paris Climate agreement.

Trump portrays himself as one who is hostile to free trade, illegal immigrants and the saviour of the 'silent majority' (Judis, 2016). Free trade in his view is unfavourable to the United States as other nations tend to gain more from the bi and multilateral trade relations. The illegal immigrants are seen as the crime executioners in America, taking away the jobs of the people and constituting potential threats to the nation, hence, his avowal to be politically correct and uncover political mysteries hitherto covered by the previous establishment in order to reshape the political defect caused by the establishment.

Paul Nolte (2016) argues that although the establishment and institutions are faulty and could awaken the desire for better administration and institutions, it is instructive to note that current status quo ante signals a dramatic lack of legitimacy for transnational institutions, a lack of understanding for the necessary complexity of multi-layered institutions in the 21st century; and most of all, a product of ruthless seduction by populist politicians with false claims of returning to a simple world of order. Therefore, the recourse to one's own nation and a framework of national politics undisturbed by transnational entanglements and obligations take the centre stage, be it in Trump's "make America Great Again", in the anti-EU thrust of the Brexit movement. The utopian society of populists everywhere is a stable society of indigenous citizens, not disturbed by globalization, by mobility and migration (Nolte, 2016).

The above reveals that there is a gradual reduction of legitimacy to the global project by the advanced capitalist world. This points to the central fact that, globalization, like every other social reality, is subject to the logic of dialectics, as the growing call among great powers to withdraw systematically from the global project contradicts their age-long position when they evangelised the indispensability of globalization.

Conclusion

Despite the irrefutable benefits of globalization, there has emerged a repudiation among great powers who at one time publicised the imperativeness of globalization. The resultant backlash of globalization and the increased ineffectiveness of global institutions have reinforced the urge to withdraw from the global project (especially international organizations and cooperations). Simultaneously, this supposed ineffectiveness of global institutions is being used by populist individuals and groups as a tangible claim to justify their anti-global aspirations. Truly, since fear of becoming losers of the global project threatens the sustainability of globalization, populists present themselves as an alternative that can provide a quick fix to address the fear of the people.

It is imperative to note that populism might not be the answer to the challenges presented by the defects of globalization. Populism perhaps compounds the problem that the current international system faces, because, what populism represents is much deeper than merely pointing out the gaps of the establishment and of globalization agents and institutions. Precisely, it is 'the epiphenomenon for a crisis of modernity' (Nolte, 2016).

Therefore, the increasing vulnerability of the international system cannot be resolved

by clinging to national pedigrees as the ultimate solution. The problems and challenges of current globalization are problems without passport and demand solutions beyond borders through the same logic of globalization. The worries and anxieties of the populists should be taken into consideration in recasting the fate of the global system. Poverty, growing inequalities, insecurity, among others, represent the premises upon which populists seek to incite the masses, these concerns and worries should, therefore, be given serious thoughts. Specifically, the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations which envisage freeing the world of poverty, restore and protect the sanity of the eco-system and ensure peace and stability could be the right point of departure for national and international bodies in combating the rise of populism in current times.

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