Hyper-Rational Choice and Economic Behaviour

Advances in Mathematical Finance and Applications

مقاله 6، دوره 3، شماره 3، آذر 2018، صفحه 69-76   

نوع مقاله: Research Paper

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22034/amfa.2018.544950

نویسندگان

Majid Eshaghi Gordji^* ؛ Gholamreza Askari

Department of Mathematics, Semnan University P.O. Box 35195-363, Semnan, Iran

چکیده

In this paper, with help of the concept of hyper-rationality, we model the interaction between two investment companies by an important game as trickery game that has special equilibrium which called hyper-equilibrium. In trickery game, one company can choose cooperation with another company until the last moment and finally changes his action to non-cooperation which incur more loss to an opponent. Indeed, the hyper-equilibrium is the point in which only one player can displace equilibrium to another point by changing his action which causes profit or loss to other players so they cannot change their action. Our findings indicate that the kind of behaviour interactive, environmental conditions, and valuation system are based on hostility causes an equilibrium point to incur the maximum loss to an opponent.

کلیدواژه‌ها

Game Theory؛ Rationality؛ Economic behavior؛ Nash Equilibrium

مراجع

[1] Eshaghi-Gordji, M., Askari, Gh., Hyper-Rational Choice Theory (October 20, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3099441(Doi:10.2139/ssrn.3099441).

[2] Eshaghi-Gordji M., and Gholamreza Askari. Dynamic system of strategic games. Int. J. Nonlinear Anal. Appl., 2018, 9(1), P.83–98.

[3] Harsanyi, J. C., Advances in understanding rational behavior. In Essays on ethics, social behavior, and scientific explanation, Springer, 1980, P.89-117.

[4] Harsanyi. J. C., Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. CUP Archive, 1986.

[5] McCarty, N., Meirowitz, A., Political game theory: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[6] Nash, J.F., Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 1950, 36(1), P.48-49.

[7] Nash. J., Non-cooperative games. Annals of mathematics, 1951, P.286-295,

[8] Martin J.O., An introduction to game theory, volume 3. Oxford university press New York, 2004.

[9] Poundstone, W., Prisoner, Dilemma/John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb. Anchor, 1993.

[10] James N., Game theory: decisions, interaction and Evolution. Springer Science and Business Media, 2007.