Consequence Modeling of a Rupture of Methyl Diethanolamine (MDEA) Storage Spherical Tank (Catastrophic Rupture Scenario)

Journal of Chemical Health Risks

مقاله 9، دوره 12، شماره 2، شهریور 2022، صفحه 213-221   

نوع مقاله: Original Article

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22034/jchr.2020.1875552.1043

نویسندگان

Mojtaba Khorani¹؛ Mohsen Mansouri^{* 2}؛ Seyyed Hossein Hosseini¹؛ Naimeh Setarehshenas³

¹Department of Chemical Engineering, Ilam University, Ilam 69315-516, Iran

²Department of Chemical Engineering, Ilam University, Ilam, Iran

³Department of Chemical Engineering, Eyvan-e-Gharb Branch, Islamic Azad University, Eyvan 694111-1359, Iran

چکیده

The rupture of flammable materials is one of the significant hazards existing in huge industry. In this study, the rupture of methyl diethanolamine (MDEA) tank in Ilam gas treatment refinery was modeled by PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) software. Distances with high risk was determined in fire and explosion scenarios versus consequence modeling. The results revealed that the catastrophic rupture scenario of MDEA tank in summer climates is the worst case with the highest risk, since in this case, the affected distance is about 2,450 meters for explosion overpressure, and 840 meters for vapor release; thus, these distances should be nonresidential. By considering a bund wall around the tank, the abovementioned distance reduce to 1,860 meters for explosion overpressure and 780 meters for vapor release.

کلیدواژه‌ها

Consequence Assessment؛ Release؛ Catastrophic Rupture Scenario؛ Methyl Diethanolamine Storage Tank

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