Developing a Framework for Analyzing the Causes of Corruption

Journal of Optimization in Industrial Engineering

مقاله 6، دوره 15، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 32، شهریور 2022، صفحه 67-77   

نوع مقاله: Original Manuscript

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22094/joie.2021.1928509.1851

نویسندگان

Ali Naghi Mashayekhi؛ Mehran Sepehri؛ Seyed Mohammad Amin Aghamiri^*

Graduate School of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

چکیده

In this paper, a framework for effective factors on the occurrence of economic corruption is presented. Corruption issues as an existing challenge need to be addressed comprehensively and accurately. Various factors affect this issue, and the lack of precise and comprehensive identification of these factors can create a constraint, in which the main causes of corruption may not be addressed and efforts may focus on less important issues. The existence of a framework of factors helps by examining the level of these factors and makes it possible to identify the strengths and weaknesses of context and personal factors to design and implement corrective solutions and eliminating weaknesses, so the probability of economic corruption decreases. To achieve this framework, the factors affecting the economic corruption occurring at both individual and national levels in the literature are studied and carefully rooted to find the basic causes of corruption. The basic causes can be classified into three levels of individual, organizational and social. By gathering and categorizing these factors, a framework for the factors affecting economic corruption is presented.

کلیدواژه‌ها

Corruption؛ Framework؛ Individual؛ Organizational؛ Social

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