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Discourse Analysis of Islamic Revolution Third Generation and Its Role in Political Development | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Middle East Political Review | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| دوره 6، شماره 1، آذر 2023، صفحه 205-220 اصل مقاله (459.9 K) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| نوع مقاله: Original Article | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| نویسنده | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Seyed Abbas Husseini* | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Ph.D. in Political Thought, Chalous Branch, Islamic Azad University, Chalous, Iran | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| چکیده | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| The Islamic revolution has undergone many generations since its formation. In this regard, four generations can be identified throughout the life of Islamic Republic. The third generation is one of the generations of Islamic Republic which has taken discourse functionality through enjoying from its special characteristics, overcoming demands and utilizing from elements and slogans of reform discourse and has defined itself as anti-discourse versus dominant discourse. The purpose of present study was to investigate the third generation of Islamic Revolution and its role in political development using discourse analysis method. Hence, the main question of present study is that: the discursive elements of Islamic Revolution's third generation are received from what kind of structures? And how can the third generation play a role in political development of Iran after the revolution? Following hypothesis was considered to answer the main question: the third generation of Islamic Revolution receives its discursive elements from structures such as characteristics, overcoming demands and utilizing from elements and slogans of reform discourse and can play a significant role in political development with its approach to liberal discourse. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| discourse analysis؛ Political Development؛ Islamic Revolution؛ Pahlavi discourse؛ Islamic Revolution discourse؛ Islam | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| اصل مقاله | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Introduction Change and evolution of generations is one of the major issues in the field of sociology. The social sciences encyclopedia has defined Generation as: Generation in demography refers to a group of people who begin or end a stage of life with each other. According to baker, "generation" means a group of individuals born within a given time interval (Biro, 1991:323). Basically, this term plays a role in political sociology that considers political behavior associated with generations, because the generation is as important as social class in expressing individual and group differences, as well as explaining culture, interests and behavior. From a psychological and sociological point of view, there is a difference between insights, features and desires of two generations. Naturally, no generation completely reflects the ideals of its previous generation, especially characteristics and features of previous generation. Each generation has its own particular psychological and social conditions, which certainly includes positive and negative aspects. The evolution needs that new generation not to be the leader of its previous generation in the terms of feature, character and insight, especially given the fact that pace of change in all areas of human life has grown rapidly and exponentially (Sarou Khani, 1991: 589). Hence, the difference between generations must be assumed and this difference is more than ever felt. The risky state of this situation is the gap between generations and means the gradual phasing out of two or three successive generations, which creates a new situation in the terms of geographical, emotional, intellectual, and value. Such a situation is called generations' breakdown. The set of differences between two generations are: 1) differences in ideals and goals of two generations, 2) difference in the concepts of two generation, 3) differences in modeling and reference groups, 4) differences in daily terms of two generations, 5) differences in appearance, dressing and speech of two generations and 6) difference in the expectation of life and consequently difference in lifestyle. These differences and features create a new nature for the new generation which is different from previous generations (Sarou Khani, 1991: 591). Various factors play role in formation of this difference and gap between generations. Some of these factors are natural such as age requirements and some are due to the specific condition of community and the current world (Iranian Scientific Documents Center, 1997: 22).
In present study, the discourse analysis method has been used to explain and analyze the data. In the term of methodology, this analytical method has features and characteristics that distinguish it from other social science methods. As an example, the break-down of discourses is regarded as assumed in theory of discourse; while the presuppositions of historical theories like Hegel's philosophy are the continuity of history and their non-breaking. Discourse analysis has various meanings in a way that utilizing each of them as a social science method can lead to distinct consequences. The most important of these are: Discourse theory in linguistics, Norman discourse theory and Michel Foucault's discourse theory and Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe. Present study is based on analysis method of Laclau & Mouffe which is an extended theory of Foucault's discourse and his genealogy (Haghighat, 2007: 3). Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have been largely affected by Michel Foucault. Foucault has taken three courses in his methodology. These three courses are: 1) the method of discourse and paleontology (1954-1699); 2) the relationship between belief and practice with genetic traits (1977 1984); 3) finally, the use of Paradigm method especially in the formation of self-concept and gender (1984-1977), respectively (Germeyr.Carrrtte, 2000, 123). According to Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, discourse is a sum of interconnected propositions and since these statements are material, they are tied to the historical and temporal context. According to them, the verdict is atom and particle of each discourse and because it does not have a linguistic form, it is not a sign but a kind of verbal action (Germeyr.Carrrtte, 2000, 123). Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe believe that human beings are in a position to be subject in certain conditions. This is the discourse that places human beings in the position of subjecting (Laclau.1990.61-64). According to them, the character of a subject is fragmented not integrated, so the subject itself is reality of a legend. In the viewpoint of Laclau and Mouffe, every subject is a legendary subject. Legend means a representation space, which has no continuity relationship with structural objectivity. Subject has metaphorical mode, because there is a logical relationship between discourse and restlessness and disquietude. Every society needs a myth. A society that has no myth is cemetery or luggage. As the mythic space becomes wider, the realm of action becomes greater. Discourse analysis is provided by elements such as articulation, central slogan, hegemony, subject or individuality, otherness or opposition (Laclau.1990.61-64).
Political development is considered as a contemplative topic in Iran as a necessary process in the beginning of the third millennium. Because the human society in twentieth century has experienced the process of transition from tradition to modernism and political development was necessarily the result of this experiment. In a definition about political development proposed by social science thinkers and specifically political science thinkers, it has been stated that political development is a process to provide necessary ground for institutionalization, which results in increased capacity of a political system. . In the process of political development, it is emphasized on the political system's capacities for carrying out public policies and overtaking modern behavioral patterns on traditional patterns in political behavior (Azkia, 2009: 49). It seems that the desired models of third generation of the Islamic Revolution on political development are a combination of Almond and Powell's patterns as well as Ronald F. Inglehart's transformational theory of political development. (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 5). Almond and Paul have considered political development as a process of consistency and collective actions for partnership of generations with a view to achieving consensus, so that such a partnership can guarantee allegiance and its accompaniment to political system of democracy (Qavam, 2009: 18) and the implementation of reforms with components such as plurality of parties, electoral competitions, political stability, preventing from tension in political structure, expansion of civil society, pluralism, press and freedom of opinion (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 5). Therefore, if the criteria for political development in Iran with models of Almond and Powell and components of democracy and reformation are considered as a hypothetical and assumed matter, political development in the political and social space of Iran will be provided through generation's participation and will (Mousavi Nia , 2008: 5). On the other hand, such a definition of political development is semantically related to Ronald Inglehart's value transformational theory. Engleght's argument in the theory of value change is based on two hypotheses. These two hypotheses are hypothesis of scarcity and hypothesis of socialization and participation. These two hypotheses are the basis for changes in values of individuals and generations of a society and any development especially political development would be possible with changing in values of generations. According to Inglehtar, we are witnessing the movement and transition of material values of individuals to meta-material values in the process of transforming values. Material values indicate acceptance of a generation about current condition of society, but the meta-material values indicate the highest mental values of generations of a society about things and issues that are relatively presented in low scale. According to the above definition, the desired development would be possible through paying attention to transcending values of participation of generations and covenant with the political system of democracy (Sadra, 2008: 17). It is clear that the combination of these two models in political development can be an acceptable and non-repugnant criterion for third generation of Islamic Revolution in relation to political development.
As it was mentioned before, Islamic revolution has undergone many generations since its formation. In this regard, four generations have been identified throughout the life of Islamic Republic, which their performance in the course and process of Islamic Revolution has had their own effects on the quality and quantity of political system and its development or under-development. Each of these generations have been separately evaluated in continue.
The first generation of revolution was formed in the struggle against Shah between 1960s and 1970s, and found an opportunity to serious emergence in 1960s. In the 1960s and '70s, Pahlavi discourse dominated the political and social atmosphere of Iran, which engineered a particular cultural system. This discourse was based on elements (reasons) such as extreme nationalism, secularism, and pseudo-modernism (Haghigat, 2007: 5). The central slogan of this discourse was Shah and his divine legitimacy and other concepts were articulated around this central slogan. There was also Islam and Islamic concepts in this discourse but they were in the second place of importance. Since1960s and '70s, the society moved to another atmosphere and the political and social atmosphere of Iran witnessed the emergence of a new clerical-centered civil society which was independent of government. This civil society created a generation that provided the grounds for Islamic Revolution. This new emerged generation should be considered as an anti-discourse of Pahlavi discourse that defined a set of values and meanings in an interpersonal manner. This anti-discourse centered on Ayatollah Khomeini as the central slogan had the ability to dominate Pahlavi discourse. In Ayatollah Khomeini's discourse, there were floating slogans such as oppression, arrogance, poor individuals, independence, freedom and religiosity. The reasons of these slogans were concepts such as Shah, the United States, and noble nations of the world, non-aligned states, religious freedom, and the interpretation of political Islam (Haghighat, 2007: 6). Re-production of this discourse would require that this discourse be able to define reasons or examples for its slogans. In the other side, Re-production of this discourse needed others' discourse or anti- discourse which posed the rival discourse i.e. Pahlavi. Pahlavi's discourse was also needed as an anti-discourse in its presentation (Haghighat, 2007: 7). The floating slogans of Imam's discourse and its reasons as well as the reasons for anti-discourse of Pahlavi's discourse have been represented in following table.
Table (1), floating slogans and reasons of discourse of first generation centered on the central slogan (Ayatollah Khomeini)
The second generation of Islamic Revolution has come from individuals and people experiencing the era of Thermidor, the age of terror, the age of war and the age of Revolution's stabilization. The discourse of second generation utilized from Islamic and liberal doctrines. In other words, these doctrines can be interpreted as Islamic and liberal subdivisions which have shaped liberal Islam. Floating slogans of liberal Islam can be articulated with concepts such as 1) Iran, 2) Islamism, 3) development; 4) transnational role for revolution, 5) expanding of Revolution (Kashi, 2007: 43). Therefore, there are two spectrums of thought in second generation of the revolution centered on the discourse of liberal Islam. The first spectrum of liberal Islam discourse is related to discourse of Islamic doctrine, which bounds to teachings of traditional and ideological Islam and enjoys from elements of ideological state with components such as traditional Islam and Islamic tradition. The reasons and elements of this sub- discourse include: 1) superiority of Islamic origin to Iranian origin, 2) Political Islam centered on Velayat-e Faqih (Supreme Leader of the Faqih), 3) native development, 4) engineering of freedom movements, 5) indirect intervention (Kashi, 2007: 43). The second spectrum of liberal Islam discourse is related to discourse of liberal doctrine. This spectrum is shaped by technocrats, whose most important work is transformation and are intended to bring teachings from the West to Iran. This spectrum is the head of reformist movement and aims to transition toward democracy and political development of Iran's recent history. The central slogan of this sub-discourse is formed by political development (Tajik, 2007: 15). The floating slogans of this sub-discourse include civil society, pluralism, tolerance, democracy, economic development, and meta-material values which have been articulated around central slogan of political development. The reasons and elements of this sub- discourse include: 1) superiority of Iranian origin to Islamic origin, 2) Secular Islam, 3) Single-line development, 4) Spiritual and verbal support, 5) gradual expanding of revolution and no intervention (Kashi, 2007: 44). The floating slogans and reasons related to discourse of liberal Islam have been represented separately in following table. Table (2), the floating slogans and reasons related to discourse of liberal Islam
Therefore, the second generation of Islamic revolution should be considered in a confused manner with its special the floating slogans and reasons. The reason for this confused manner of second generation of Islamic revolution is that intellectual tendencies of this generation of revolution are fluctuating between Islamic doctrines and liberal doctrines with taking into account hegemony of the liberal Islamic discourse (Kashi, 2007: 43). In the other words, the second generation of Islamic Revolution is caught up with the problem of identity crisis due to the persistent path of discursive traits, because each of the Islamic and liberal tendencies of this discourse has never been able to turn itself into dominant discourse and find hegemony. Therefore, it is natural that rule of game between these sub-discourses of this generation does not result in zero-sum algebraic summation (Tajik, 2007: 16).
The third generation is one of the generations in the life of Islamic Republic of Iran. This generation is made up of young people from the 90's and can be considered as children of second generation of the revolution. This generation has no experience before the revolution and war and has undergone reform in childhood. (Co-Operation Office of Islamic School and University, 2007: 219). It has been said that generation of the 70s has found its existence in the political social space of Iran and asks for its identity with reaching to intellectual and political maturity (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 6). The third generation of the revolution has its own normative layers. In this regard, it can be referred to institutional norms, excellent norms and normative layering of this generation. The dominant discourse of third generation is Islamic sub-discourse of the second generation. This sub-discourse failed to manifest itself as a super-discourse and dominant discourse in the second generation, but it is currently turning itself into a dominant discourse and hegemonic status in the third generation with "The Only Paley" in the Thom manner (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 6). This discourse has been formed from layers such as Velayat-e Faqih, the executive branch, the judiciary branch and the legislature branch (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 6). Proper recognition of the third generation and its characteristics and demands are of considerable importance. This importance is only relevant to policy and executive departments of the country. The third generation takes its discourse capabilities through its characteristics and overcoming its unique demands. These characteristics and demands can be interpreted as the facts or knowledge structures of third-generation discourse. Beside these characteristics and demands, elements and flagons of reformism and approaching the liberal anti-discourse should be also added to these structures and fact in order to increase its discourse functionality and challenge and critique the dominant and rival discourse. In other words, the components and variables available to transform third generation into discourse can be articulated in three sets of facts and structures of knowledge as follow: a) special characteristics of third generation, b) overcoming demands of third generation, c) utilizing from elements and slogans of reform discourse and 4) approaching to liberal anti-discourse. These variables and components are the basis for creating facts and knowledge structure so that the third generation turns into a discourse and in particular an anti-discourse in order to the dominant and rival discourse (Center for Studies in the Parliament, 2007: 52).
Characteristics of third generation as a part of knowledge structure creating and discourse capability (power generation) can be articulated in the following structures: 1) The third generation has a more integrated and independent identity in the term of personality. 2) The third generation focuses on the essence of religion rather than on religious appearances. 3) The third generation more prefers to be seemed as it is and less tends to concealment in behaviors. 4) The third generation thinks optimistic about interacting with the world and various cultures. 5) The third generation is more realistic and measures individual and social plans more with the criteria of availability, feasibility and proximity compared with previous generation. 6) Contrary to some perceptions of political sociology, the third generation has no tendency to separation of religion from politics based on historical experience; rather it tends to modify the relationship between them. 7) The third generation is interested in economic growth and development in political controversy but it is elusive about apoliticism. 8) The aesthetic and artistic tendencies of this generation are more than the previous generations. 9) The third generation is more intimate and more comfortable with others. 10) The dynamism and spirit of criticism are the hallmarks of this generation. This generation reacts quickly to possible deviations and rectifies mistakes and errors without resorting to violence. 11) The global conditions, explosion of information and rapid flow of information and use of virtual world (Internet and Satellite) have provided dynamic and powerful analysis to this generation. 12) The third generation has a high level of follow-up and highly affected by others. 12) The cultural, artistic and aesthetic dimensions of Iranian culture are of great interest to this generation (Center for Studies in the Parliament, 2007: 54).
Demands of third generation as a part of semantic system and discourse capability (power generation) can be articulated in the following structures: 1) the need for friendship and kindness, 2) the need for security and comfort, 3) the need for a sense of belonging, 4) the need for acceptance and respect, 5) the need for independence, 6) the need for appreciation, 7) the need for having a specific goal in life, 8) need to feel the identity and self-scrutiny, 9) the need for a sense of growth, perfection and self-esteem, the need for spirituality and religion, 10) the need for modeling, 11) intellectual engineering, 12) opportunism, 13) ambiguity in various areas of the political and social system, 14) nostalgic and transition to the civilization and archaism, 15) intellectual consensus, 16) formulation of a charter of law and awareness of social rights, 17) the existence of mechanisms and ways to restore the legal system in the political, legal and civic areas; 18) the absence of conflicting and hostile policies with ideas, 19) transparent information and the possibility of creating an open exchange of information, 20) the possibility of freedom of expression and freedom after expression(Center for Studies in the Parliament, 2007: 56).
Utilizing from elements and slogans of reform discourse as elements of knowledge structure creating and discourse capability (power generation) can be articulated in the following structures: 1) The dominant discourse deconstruction strategy, 2) the containment of floating slogans related to the dominant discourse and providing its reasons to dominant discourse, 3) the exploitation of micro-physics of power and micro-politics of demand, 4) creation of homogeneous chains of distinct identities, 5) using the characteristics of community movement instead of the organizational characteristics of the community; 5) using the oral and public activities; 6) benefiting from the logic of multilateral determination; 7) organizing the carnival movement, 8) radicalization of democracy, 9) establishment of intellectual associations and meetings for realization of goals, 10) application of hegemony through civil society, 11) the emphasis on discursive confiscation, 12) development of particular intellectuals, 13) the sharpening of protest, 14) creating conditions for pluralism and multi-voicing, 15) emphasis on democracy and distance from pseudo-authoritarianism in the process of political life (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 7).
Liberal discourse should be considered as anti-discourse of dominant discourse in social and political life of third generation. Approaching third generation to liberal discourse as a part of knowledge structure and power generation can significantly help to political development. The dominant discourse in political and social life of the third generation has its own elements that can be articulated with loops like Supreme Leader of the Faqih (Ayatollah Khamenei), Ahmadinejad and Larijani as elements and structures of knowledge (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 8). Liberal discourse is the most serious rival of dominant discourse. This discourse is vital for establishing the political boundaries and consolidating a part of anti-discourse identity. The matter can be referred as logic of difference. Liberal discourse has also its own three layers, which can be articulated as follow.
The most important contribution that dominant discourse can make to the third generation in political development is ineffectiveness and unhealthy management of this discourse in directing nuclear projects and targeting subsidies. Therefore, if the dominant discourse cannot correctly and logically manage the challenges and barriers to mentioned project, liberal discourse will manage the projects with its related layers and providing new examples and alternatives. It is natural that this correct and logical management of liberal discourse brings the third generation beside it due to the intellectual and political affiliations of it with this generation, which their efforts will result in political development. In other word, in this competitive atmosphere combined with perceptual and operational forms, the third generation finds itself in favor of liberal discourse to make the path of its goals on political development more possible and flexible (Mousavi Nia, 2008: 11).
Conclusion Investigating the fact about generations of Islamic Revolution suggests this critical point that a part of differences between generations is natural due to the dominance of discourse space. Therefore, ideals, needs and feelings of the younger generation of each society are different from its previous generation. Generally, new generations are modifying or changing parts of the views of previous generations and sometimes these modifications and changes appear very serious. If this difference is properly understood and treated in the right way, it not only will have no side effect but also lead to the development of future generations. It should be noted that the transformation of new generations is largely natural and can be assumed, but if the gap of generations is to be understood as the termination and revolution of generations i.e. the phenomenon of generations faces with sudden changes in a particular conditions so that makes it possible to use the term revolution about generations and all concepts, propositions and tastes are suddenly changed, then definitely it can be argued that the realization of this is not a fact, but an illusion because revolution in generations occurs when old norms and values are vanishing and new values appear with reformative and developmental approaches. As it can be observed from evidences, the emergence of reformist and developmental approaches has shown itself with dynamics of the third generation of Revolution in today's political and social atmosphere. The signs of such an emergence were more appeared during the tenth presidential election and particularly the day after election on June 11, 2008. The third generation of Revolution didn't consider it as a duty but as its legal right. The political and social crisis of that time in Iran also required doing so. But this right did not continue with deconstruction of rival discourse and shifted the development-oriented and reformative approaches for a long time. In this regard, the main point is that durability of any development-oriented and reformative approach can lead to a departure from current status only when it moves from duty-orienting toward right-orienting. Such an approach to the fourth generation of revolution which is now their childhood and adolescence, can be a prime example for development-oriented approaches so that the political social space of Iran remains at the line of development and provides the ground for developments and what has been referred as sustainable development. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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